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Introduction 
 
 Moral, aesthetic, and religious pluralism has become a source of disagreement 
and friction in the modern world. Within the context of modernity and precipitated by the 
American and French revolutions, liberal democracy has aimed to organize the social and 
political life of societies in which their inhabitants sustain different, distant, and 
sometimes contradictory conceptions of the good life. Liberal secular principles have 
been the framework used to protect fundamental values such us freedom, equality, and 
mutual respect. In order to preserve the stability of a plural society, liberalism insists that 
moral and religious convictions must remain a private matter. Democracy and tolerance, 
it was argued, would be best preserved if religious convictions were removed from the 
public/political conversation. Yet the debate about the appropriate relationship between 
religion and politics regularly resurfaces among political and moral philosophers, social 
theorists, and theologians.  
 This modern/liberal trend, which pushes comprehensive schemes and substantive 
views of life into the private realm, represents a major dilemma for Christian faith. 
Today, especially after the Second Vatican Council, most Christians would not hesitate to 
accept and cherish some of the most relevant liberal principles, such as church/state 
separation, liberty, equality, and tolerance. However, those who hold the Christian faith 
are also conscious that some of the convictions they maintain are destined to have greater 
political implications. While promoters of secular liberalism strongly discourage citizens 
from bringing their religious convictions into the public discourse, religious people 
believe that they should be heard on their own terms. Burning social, ethical, and political 
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affairs such as the moral status of the embryo, abortion, the end of life, and a fair 
distribution of the necessary means of life show how moral and religious convictions 
indeed play a role in the public conversation at the level of the civil society.  
 Can religious convictions modify and be modified by political discourse? How 
does religion enter into the political debate? How can religious reasons become part of 
political arguments? Given the fact that believers enter public life using their own 
reasons, informed by their symbolic, religious, and humanist convictions, the public 
discussion would be more democratic if citizens made their own convictions public. 
 Every time human beings approach dialogue they are already expressing a certain 
set of comprehensive convictions that inform their political conceptions. Citizens are 
willing to negotiate some of their beliefs in order to protect liberty and mutual respect, 
but what happens when this negotiation reaches the core identity of an individual? Are 
citizens willing to give up the piece of their identity that belongs to the very definition of 
who they are? If we really want to build up an enduring pluralism, we have to be capable 
of bringing the full description of who we are to public life. Pluralism has to build upon 
an open dialogue in which our horizons of meaning encounter and permeate each other, 
because it is in this encounter with others where our identities become permeable. Can 
tolerance and mutual respect be sustained by a merely formal political arrangement?  
 This thesis will defend the legitimacy, for believers, of shared loyalty: a deep 
allegiance to the ultimate convictions that define who we are and that are fundamental to 
our identities, and, at the same time a clear receptivity to differences and an explicit 
loyalty to pluralism. How can Christians remain faithful to their faith and keep a strong 
commitment to the respect of liberty and equality?  
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 This thesis will also inquire into the public role of Christian faith: How may 
Christian theology offer some sense of a wider and fundamental hope for the world 
without endeavoring to become hegemonic?  How can Christians bring about a 
distinctively Christian orientation to social and political debates, all the while remaining 
committed to liberty, equality, and mutual respect? How can the Catholic Church find her 
own voice within the achievements of modernity without giving up her own 
political/public nature? Whereas Christian faith must be aware that faith in Jesus Christ is 
not a private matter, it must also be aware that any public role of religion has to avoid any 
kind of control over public affairs.  
 I will argue in this thesis not only that religion –in particular Christianity– may 
legitimately play a role in the public sphere of a liberal democracy, but also that religious 
arguments may contribute to the construction of a common notion of shared ends and 
goods –all the while maintaining a commitment to freedom, equality, and mutual respect. 
The aim of this work is to explore the relationship between Christian faith and liberalism 
as the dominant, modern, public morality. While exploring the nature of this relationship 
I hope to be able to offer some moral and theological grounds for a public theology of a 
pluralist public life in a global world.  
 Even though history has proved the fittingness of church/state separation, I will 
claim that to divide religion and politics is much more complicated. The relationship 
between religion and politics is something more complex than the public/private division. 
There are some crucial aspects of human life that are frequently removed from public life 
by some approaches to political liberalism.  
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 Christian faith is of its very nature public and political, but it must be able to 
present its convictions in a manner accessible to all human beings. Religion has to find its 
place in a society of free and equal citizens. The question will be not only how to build 
up a theology for a pluralist public life, but also how to offer a renewed version of 
liberalism that is not necessarily grounded on neutrality, secularism, and procedural-
contractual formalism. How can we retrieve the historical, ethical, and social background 
of Western societies without jeopardizing liberty and equality? A democratic and plural 
culture, in order to be consistent with its own principles, should be able to accept 
religious freedom and pluralism as part of its very definition.  
 Three chapters comprise this thesis. The first one, Religion in a Plural World, 
explores the challenge that liberal secularism represents for Christian faith. There I aim to 
draw out the tension between the liberal trend towards the privatization of religion and 
what I call in this work the irreducible political nature of Christian faith. We will look at 
the philosophy of the late John Rawls, one of the most relevant exponents of liberalism, 
in order to grasp the consequences of this morality for the public role of religion. In their 
turn, the theologies of Johann Baptist Metz and Jürgen Moltmann will help us to define 
the political character of Christianity. The penultimate section examines the relationship 
between religious convictions and political reasons. And the last section offers an 
assessment of the notion of secularization in order to situate this thesis in a wider context.  
 Once I have described the nature of the dilemma between the privatization of 
religion and the political ethos of Christianity, I will explore the philosophy of Charles 
Taylor. In doing so I hope to offer a revised view of liberalism that eschew the 
privatization of religion and it welcomes the contribution of communities of faith (and 
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symbolic, aesthetic, and ethical schemes in general) in shaping the identity of modern 
democratic societies. I believe that Taylor’s thought might offer a third way between 
communitarianism and formal liberalism, a way capable of recovering some of the most 
significant liberal commitments, yet also capable of recovering a richer, fuller, and more 
comprehensive approach to human agency. A more comprehensive view of ethical life 
might give more room for the contribution of religious communities to the public 
conversation.  
 Finally, after having attempted to prove that religion –and Christian faith in 
particular– may play a legitimate public/political role in modern societies, we will return 
to the issue of its irreducibly political nature. This time, however, we do so in order to 
demonstrate that Christian faith probably offers its best contribution to modern life in 
announcing an apocalyptic hope. We will see that the political nature of hope is to be 
found not in a particular concrete content, but in the imminent eschatological expectation 
that makes discipleship urgent. The contrast between the eschatological biblical-divine 
promises and the reality of the victims of history gives to the Church a crucial public role 
announcing hope.  
 When arguing for the political/public role of religious communities and Christian 
faith, an important distinction must be made. The concepts “public” and “political” will 
refer to the same reality, unless something different is said. They will be treated as 
synonyms for public sphere (plaza/domain/realm) and will refer to civil society and never 
to the level of the State or the government. As we will see in the last section of the second 
chapter, civil society will be defined as a web of associations that, being independent 
from the State and going beyond government, are influential in the elaboration of public 
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policies. This distinction fits within another important distinction in this thesis: whereas 
we have to defend the church/state separation principle, we will see that religion and 
politics seem to be hard to divide.  
 10 
I. Religion in a Plural World 
 
 The defenders of the modern-constitutional values of freedom, equality, and 
mutual respect have developed a moral-political-philosophical position often called 
political liberalism. This group of thinkers has sought to retool these principles for a 
secular pluralistic society. Accordingly, these sets of principles, which reflect some of the 
most important achievements of modernity, would be best preserved if religion were 
removed from the public sphere. The secular-liberal principle of the separation between 
the church and the State entails for them that belief, religious practice, and the notion of 
the good and of the beautiful should be treated as private matters. If religion is confined 
to the private life, its principles can forge personal behavior without interfering in public 
affairs.  
 Broadly speaking, this is the moral framework in which Christianity and public 
religions in general ought to develop their own commitments. This would not be a 
problem if Christian faith intended to shape only the private consciousness of the 
individual person. But, as I will argue in this chapter, if we accept that Christianity 
endeavors to confer a certain theological and moral order not only to the individual 
consciousness but to the whole world, then the modern liberal moral paradigm becomes a 
problem for Christian faith.   
 The present chapter will explore the nature and the consequences of this tension. 
The first two sections are devoted to articulating the dilemma between the modern trend 
towards the privatization of religion and what I call the irreducibly political character of 
Christian faith. The third section examines the relationship between religious convictions 
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and political reasons in order to defend the proposition that believers should be allowed 
to make public use of their beliefs in the public realm. Finally, an assessment of the 
concept of secularization will offer a wider context for the question of the place and the 
role of communities of faith in the modern world.  
 
1. Liberal Secularism 
 
Liberalism has probably become the dominant modern public morality in the 
West. It emerged as a bulwark against cruelty after the 16th century religious wars, as 
Judith Shklar often stressed1. We find its most influential, systematic and contemporary 
version in John Rawls “Political Liberalism”.  
This first section will consider the meaning and consequences of Rawls’ later 
philosophy. Rawls’ main concern is to provide a philosophy that allows for the stability 
of a democratic regime in a plural culture. This author synthesizes the modern-liberal-
deontological morality in a single project that seeks to protect democracy and mutual 
respect on the basis of a formal conception of justice.  A nuanced presentation of his 
philosophy will be crucial for understanding some of the most significant challenges that 
religious reasons have to face in contemporary western societies.  A good portion of the 
rest of this work will respond to the underlying, but often-unchallenged, presuppositions 
of liberal thought.  
 
 
                                                      
1
 Judith Shklar. Political Thought and Political Thinkers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
“Putting Cruelty First” in Ordinary Vices (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1984) 
 12 
a. John Rawls’ Version of Political Liberalism 
In 1993, 22 years after A Theory of Justice, Rawls published Political Liberalism. 
In A Theory of Justice Rawls wanted to develop the social contract doctrine –particularly 
in the tradition of Locke, Rousseau and Kant– in order to provide an alternative 
foundation to social justice than the one adopted by utilitarianism. Here Rawls attempted 
to establish a procedure capable of defining universal rules that would permit a rational 
evaluation of the morality of public institutions and practices by rational, equal and free 
individuals. Retrieving the idea of a “state of nature”, Rawls proposes the notion of 
original position, a hypothetical situation where free and equal persons within a sphere of 
impartiality (veil of ignorance) choose fair principles of justice in order to found the basic 
structure of society and, thereby, constitute a well-ordered society.  
One of the most controversial aspects of A Theory of Justice was its character as a 
moral comprehensive doctrine. The principles of justice developed by Rawls became a 
systematic substitution for other comprehensive doctrines. The conception of “justice as 
fairness” –that aimed to reconcile freedom and equality in one single theory– was seen by 
the critics as another comprehensive scheme incompatible with other reasonable 
doctrines. The tradition of the social contract was a continuation of moral philosophy that 
cannot distinguish appropriately its borders from the borders of political philosophy. A 
Theory of Justice was not clear when distinguishing those frontiers as either.  
Political Liberalism was written in order to address these controversies. In the 
second book, Rawls aims to reinstall his theory of Justice as Fairness inside a political 
conception of justice. Rawls based this turn in a distinction between (moral, philosophical 
and religious) comprehensive doctrines and a political conception of justice. Rawls 
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reduces his theory of justice to the scope of political consensus. Therefore, the new 
theory can be applied only within democratic constitutional regimes.  Here Rawls 
discovers a principle of cooperation among individuals who hold different comprehensive 
doctrines. In the context of free institutions and rights, the diversity of irreconcilable 
doctrines is a permanent fact: a fact what Rawls calls the fact of pluralism. In this context 
the stability of a democratic regime depends on consensus. As a result, the central 
question of Political Liberalism –and the question that encourages Rawls to move from a 
moral to a politically delimited conception of justice– is the following:  
 
How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable 
and just society of free and equal citizens, who remain 
profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible 
religious, philosophical and moral doctrines?2 
 
Rawls will respond with the thesis of the Overlapping Consensus. In his new 
vision, politics will not be about truth, but about stability. Facing the problem about the 
fact of pluralism –i.e. “how citizens who remained deeply divided on religious, 
philosophical and moral doctrines, can still maintain a just and stable democratic 
society”3– Political Liberalism looks for a political conception of justice able to support 
an overlapping consensus of reasonable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines.  
 A political conception of justice, as envisioned by Rawls, is freestanding, that is 
to say, not derived from any particular comprehensive doctrine. In a well-ordered society 
–and in a public political culture– reasonable citizens able to cooperate with one another 
will agree that a freestanding political conception is the unique foundation for the kind of 
                                                      
2
 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993; reprint, New York: 
Comubia University Press, 2005), 4. 
3
 Ibid., 10. 
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cooperation all citizens can reasonably be expected to support.  This conception is the 
basis for a society as a fair system of cooperation, formed by citizens who are free and 
equal.  A liberal political conception of justice, therefore, will assign to all citizens 
individual rights and liberties, will give priority to these rights and liberties over the 
different conceptions of the good, and will assure the possibility for citizens to make 
effective use of the freedoms they hold.   
 In 1980 Rawls wrote an article named Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory4, 
which is considered a work of transition towards Political Liberalism. Kantian 
constructivism, as Rawls understood it, supposes that a theory of justice depends on a 
conception of a person as a free and equal moral agent. This secures the agent’s 
autonomy while basing it on the authority of the moral law. Rawls is able to develop the 
three new ideas that will characterize his later philosophy (overlapping consensus, the 
priority of the rights over the good, and public reason) once he has abandoned Kantian 
constructivism and others forms of comprehensive liberalism. He realizes that the only 
way to face the diversity described above is to abdicate the search for truth and to 
advocate for institutions able to tolerate any reasonable comprehensive doctrine.  
The conception of person, which underlies the political conception of justice, 
implies an understanding of liberty. Freedom relies, in turn, on a sense of justice, the 
power of reason, and the capacity for sustaining a conception about the good. In political 
constructivism, the person ought to subordinate her conception of the good to a political 
conception of justice. This priority of justice over the good means that only principles of 
justice may regulate a fair system of cooperation in a plural society whose characteristic 
                                                      
4
 John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”, in Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman 
(Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999) 
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feature is the diversity of the ideas concerning the good, which derived in turn from 
different moral, philosophical and religious doctrines.  
With the idea of overlapping consensus Rawls argues that persons who hold 
different comprehensive doctrines in a well-ordered society will endorse the liberal 
political conception of justice—but for diverse reasons. This is possible because the 
freestanding political conception of justice is compatible with a number of worldviews 
that citizens might hold.  
When Rawls designed the idea of overlapping consensus he had in mind the 
problem of the stability of a well-ordered society of justice as fairness. Can reasonable5 
and rational citizens find it reasonable to endorse the conception of justice as fairness as a 
regulative principle in their own search of the good? 
Rawls believes that persons in a well-ordered society will usually do two things: 
accept just laws as reasonable and give support to a liberal conception of justice as long 
as it seems compatible with their own comprehensive notion of the good. The 
philosopher argues that individuals tend to endorse the principle of reciprocity when it 
supports institutions of mutual benefit. 
When introducing overlapping consensus, Rawls assumes that reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines would be compatible with liberal political values and liberal 
principles of justice as part of its definition of the good; so people who hold those 
doctrines will agree with the principle of justice as fairness in a well-ordered society. For 
                                                      
5
 Rawls explains what he understands for reasonable describing its two basic features: (1) “the willingness 
to propose fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them provided others do” and (2) “the willingness to 
recognize the burdens of judgment and to accept their consequences for the use of public reason in 
directing the legitimate exercise of political power in a constitutional regime”.  John Rawls, Political 
Liberalism, 54. The rational is related to the capacity of maintaining idiosyncratic ideas on the good and 
behaves according to these ideas.  
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the comprehensive reasons specific to their comprehensive doctrines, rational and 
reasonable citizens would support the stability of a democratic society for the right 
reasons. That is what Roman Catholics uphold when they affirm in the Second Vatican 
Council that:  
The human person has a right to religious freedom. This freedom means 
that all men are to be immune from coercion on the part of individuals or 
of social groups and of any human power, in such wise that in matters 
religious no one is forced to act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs. 
(…) This right of the human person to religious freedom is to be 
recognized in the constitutional law whereby society is governed and thus 
it is to become a civil right.6 
 
Here Catholics are endorsing a liberal conception of justice for reasons peculiar to 
their own comprehensive understanding of what human dignity is. Hence, Rawls sees an 
overlapping consensus as the basis of a democratic stability.  Overlapping consensus is 
stable when founded on the right reasons—namely, on the hope that reasonable citizens 
will endorse those liberal conceptions because of moral reasons of justice and 
comprehensive values grounded on their own particular views. Therefore, stability is not 
just a consequence, nor a mere result of a modus vivendi; rather it is the best choice for 
everyone because of the comprehensive values implicit in their own worldviews.  
The strength of the idea of overlapping consensus probably relies on the fact that 
it does not entail that justice be founded on an intrinsic conception of the good; rather 
justice may be sought by reasonable persons as an instrument for achieving those final 
ends peculiar to their own comprehensive views. Thus, justice as a moral value is 
compatible with justice as a procedural policy. Once people who hold reasonable 
religious, philosophical and moral doctrines accept a liberal political conception, then 
                                                      
6
 “Dignitatis Humanae” in Second Vatican Council quoted in John Rawls. “The idea of public reason 
revisited”, in Political Liberalism. 476 fn. 75  
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they also accept that, in public political deliberation, they can uphold only those liberal 
principles of justice and those public reasons that can be reasonably justified before 
others7. In the political realm, the arguments should always be political or, at least, 
compatible with the liberal political and formal principles of justice.  
Two more considerations: first, the idea of overlapping consensus applies only to 
liberal democracies and not to all; second, it operates among reasonable people who hold 
reasonable doctrines. If some people refuse to give reasonable reasons then this refusal 
does not compromise the stability of the right reasons, unless there are too many 
unreasonable people –that is those who are not able to cooperate with others on terms 
they can reasonably accept– or too many people unwilling to engage the liberal principles 
of justice.  
We probably find in Rawls’ philosophy the most influent and developed version 
of political liberalism. I have devoted some time to expounding it because I believe it 
allows us to better understand the scope and consequences of a procedural version of 
liberalism for the place and the role of comprehensive doctrines in public life. In some 
way, Rawls’s version of liberalism synthesizes what is seen as the main public morality 
in the West nowadays.   
 
 
2. The Irreducible Political Character of Christian Faith 
 
If we want to understand the dilemma between religious claims and democratic 
liberal theory, we need first to understand the essentially universal and public character of 
                                                      
7
 Here we see the connection between overlapping consensus and the idea of public reason.  
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Christian faith. Some Christian convictions have highly important political implications, 
and citizens seek to express these implications when exchanging reasons that support 
their respective ethical and political views. Liberal secularism, on the other hand, finds 
this symphony of religious voices expressed in the public square quite disturbing, 
Christians defends their right to articulate these commitments in the political realm. 
While secular liberals call upon citizens to restrain their desire to bring religious reasons 
into the public conversation, believers frequently feel compelled, in conscience, to 
communicate their religious commitments publicly-- particularly in cases related to 
ultimate questions such us the origin and the end of life.  
Three sub-sections form this section: First, the theology of faith and grace shows 
how Christian faith goes far beyond an individual-personal-private option. Secondly, a 
critical review of the official moral position of the Church on the matter of religious 
liberty will prove the necessity of a more theological commitment if we wish to grasp the 
depth of the political nature of Christian faith. Thirdly, some modern theologies will offer 
an explanation of the irreducible public character of Christianity.  
 
a. Christian Faith 
From the point of view of a believer, faith is neither a private matter nor an 
individual option, but constitutes instead an overall vision of life, including public life. It 
furnishes a narrative that shapes the identity and the life of those who hold it. Christian 
faith involves the life, praxis and the Lifeworld of an entire community. According to 
Christianity there is a basic dialogical dimension at the heart of every human experience. 
When one believes and hopes, one believes and hopes for all. There is a fundamental 
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universal impetus in Christianity that makes faith not primarily a gift for the individual, 
but for the other. That is why religion seeks to influence public life including significant 
issues of political and ethical issues. The affirmation “Jesus is the Lord”, for instance, 
does not have the grammar of a private speech act.  
Christianity does not understand faith as an “invisible inaccessible spiritual 
enclave residing within the human soul”8. Even though faith is something deeply 
personal, it cannot be identified as something private. Religious convictions are there, 
ultimately, in order to orient one’s life toward a number of ethical goals, and these goals 
are often situated eschatologically.  
Moreover, faith might be defined as the human response to the saving grace of 
God. In other words, faith is nothing other than a gracious gift from God. The theology of 
grace raises a critical question for the dilemma between the public claims of Christian 
faith and the political marginalization of religion at the hands of secular liberalism. For 
those who believe, there is something central to their identity that cannot be reduced to 
social or cultural dynamics, something that somehow transcends human, social, and 
historical conditionality.  
Central to the Christian understanding of existence is the notion of grace. For Karl 
Rahner, human beings are the event of a free and absolute self-communication of God9. 
God makes himself the most intimate, constitutive element of human life. Grace is 
nothing other than God in his own being communicating to human beings. God as the 
giver becomes himself the gift. That is why believers see God’s grace even outside 
verbalized and institutionalized Christianity. For them, the God of Jesus Christ seeks the 
                                                      
8
 Ronald Thiemann, Religion in Public Life (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univeristy Press, 1996), 155 
9
 Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, trans. William V. Dych (New York: Crossroad, 2000) 
chapter 4.  
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salvation of all human beings, offering to all his grace of liberation.  Faith requires a 
Christian to believe in the universal salvific will of God.10 The assertion that the grace of 
God (or God himself) was made irreversible by the history of the crucified and risen One 
constitutes a central part of the faith of every Christian believer.  
Some theories refer to Christianity as a narrative, a tradition among others in 
society. A narrative seems to be the way we see ourselves in a given place and period of 
time; it is part of our social imaginary. But for Christians the inner human constitution 
comes from God: it is the result of the work of grace. Thus the dilemma gets more acute. 
Religion as a practice entails an appropriate response to the Source of one’s existence; 
and Christianity in particular places God’s irruption into history through Jesus Christ as 
the foundational redeeming gift for all humanity.  
 
b. Dignitatis Humanae: Catholic Church Position on Religious 
Freedom.  
After decades of enduring Enlightenment critique and observing the development 
of the project of liberal democracy, The Catholic Church decided for first time to face the 
issue of religious freedom during the Second Vatican Council.  In this section I aim to 
look into the official position of the Church in this matter placing it in the midst of the 
discussion I am describing. We will see that in spite of the crucial advances made by 
Dignitatis Humanae in the sphere of religious convictions and public reasons, some 
                                                      
10
 The Letter to the Colossians (1,15-20) constitutes, probably, one of the passages of the Scriptures that 
best accounts for the universal character of Christianity: “all things were created through him and for him” 
(…) “He is before all things, and in him all things hold together” (…) “For in him all the fullness was 
pleased to dwell, and through him to reconcile all things for him…” The same happens if we look at 
Ephesians: "bringing together all the universe under one single head" (Ephesians 1, 10). Both texts imply 
that everything in the universe is under the influence of the Spirit of Christ: the unification of everything 
under the authority of Christ. The Church as “body of Christ” participates of Christ in this recapitulation.  
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unresolved issues remained— above all, as I will explain later, because this declaration 
relies excessively on the doctrine of natural law. 
This document traveled a rocky path through the Council, particularly because it 
acknowledged the church/state separation doctrine and gave priority to conscience over 
obedience to ecclesiastical authority. These two principles introduced a great contrast in 
relation to the standard teachings of the Church up to that time. 
According to John O’Malley,11 Catholic theologians developed a strategy capable 
of framing the conflictive new relationship of strict separation between Church and State. 
This author synthesizes the standard teaching of the Church on this issue before the 
Council: The basic principle was that “only truth has the right to freedom.”12  Since 
Catholic Church sees herself as the bearer of truth through history and since most of the 
European citizens were Catholics, then (1) the State had the obligation of fostering 
Catholicism; (2) other religions might be tolerated in order to avoid conflicts; and (3) if 
Catholics are the minority, then the State should guarantee them the necessary room to 
practice their religion, as a matter of natural law.  
By mid 20th century this doctrine was no longer convincing in the midst of the 
growing pluralism that characterizes the developed world. This doctrine was far from the 
practices of Catholic politicians and urgently needed a reform. John Courtney Murray 
and Jacques Maritain devoted much of their theological efforts to offer a revised version 
of these teachings. Their position on the issue of religious freedom and Church/State 
division eventually prevailed in the Council, but not without going through bitter 
struggles.  
                                                      
11
 John O’Malley, What Happened at Vatican II (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, Belknap 
Press, 2008), 212 
12
 Ibid. 
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A brief Declaration, Dignitatis Humanae was grounded on two basic principles of 
natural law: (1) the right of human creatures to seek the will of God in their lives, and (2) 
the act of faith, which is, in its own nature, free and uncoerced. The document aimed to 
regulate the relationship between Church and the State. The State must respect freedom 
of conscience against any kind of external coercion. Religious freedom relies basically 
upon immunity from coercion in civil society. Before the State imposes its laws, human 
beings are already moved by God to search religious truth. That is why, according to this 
doctrine, everyone has the right and the duty to freely fulfill their vocation to worship 
God. The Declaration states that the State must recognize this right constitutionally.  
Religious communities should not be prevented from teaching publicly and 
witnessing to their faith. The right of religious freedom is not to be exercised only in 
private, but in human society. The natural law doctrine plays a crucial role here. Freedom 
has its roots in divine revelation because the act of faith is in itself a free act. Human 
beings’ response to God must be free. No one can be forced to embrace faith against her 
will; nor can anyone be compelled to quit the free exercise of her faith.  
What it is significant here, in light of the aim of this thesis, is not only that the 
State has the duty to tolerate the free exercise of religion, but also that religion may 
legitimately aspire to participate somehow in the public sphere. Individuals have the right 
to order their lives according to their own convictions. We will see further on in this work 
how this right cannot be satisfied just in the private realm; rather it must be capable of 
having some public destiny.  
The advances that Dignitatis Humanae, Gaudium et Spes and the entire Council 
made on the issue of the relationship between the public/universal claims of Christianity 
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and the secular State were of great importance in relation to the place and the role of the 
Church in modern societies.  
Despite this crucial progress, two questions remain. First, how can the defense of 
religious freedom be harmonized with the faithfulness to the divine command: “Teach all 
nations” (Mt. 19:20)? In terms of modern political theory, the interesting issue here is not 
about negative liberty, but about positive liberty.13 The purpose of this thesis is not 
primarily to defend religious freedom exclusively in relation to the independence of the 
individual from interference by others (negative freedom), but to defend the right of the 
Church to go to the public realm and to “teach all nations” (positive freedom). Dignitatis 
Humanae lacks strength when advocating a notion of liberty as the free exercise of the 
political dimension of Christian faith. The main point is not only that the individual can 
freely believe and worship as she wants, but that the Church, based on her own theology, 
has the right to offer a wider language of commitment to a greater whole and a to broader 
meaning.  A theological rather than a moral approach to the political dimension of 
Christianity seems to account better for what I call here the irreducibly political character 
of Christian faith. Ultimately, the impetus to go and teach all nations does not rely on 
natural law but on theology itself. As we will see in the next section, instead of 
elaborating the natural law doctrine as a moral framework to deal with modern society, 
Christian theology should look into itself in order to discover its political nature. The 
definitive Christian claim is that God, through her communication in Jesus Christ, confers 
eschatological meaning and order to the world.  We will deepen this argument in the last 
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chapter: Christian faith should place the issue of suffering in the public sphere in order to 
offer an eschatological notion of hope.  
Second, is Dignitatis Humanae’s philosophical reliance on natural law credible in 
today’s pluralistic climate? We will probably never be able to commit ourselves in a truly 
plural dialogue as long as we continue thinking in terms of a universal, apodictic, and 
unitary (or even uniform) concept of truth, waiting to be discovered. The way we choose 
to frame this query seems to be critical in our plural world. It would be a loss if, as has 
happened with Aristotelian philosophy, faith gets confined again to a particular 
philosophical system.  The philosophy and anthropology that informs most of the 
documents delivered by the Roman Magisterium, especially regarding moral issues, 
could be subject to some discernment. Particularly in relation to the perennial reference to 
nature or the natural law as the norm for moral decision, above all, in matters of human 
sexuality. I wonder whether the Church really contributes to the vitality of democracy 
when using certain kind of philosophies, or whether she takes the risk of becoming a sort 
of sect, incapable of making herself listened by the world.  
 
c. Political Theology: the Contribution of Metz and Moltmann 
A major portion of the purpose of this thesis aims to stress that Christian faith 
cannot remain silent when secular liberalism pushes it to the margins of communal life. A 
theology committed to its own ethos should keep alive the struggle for a public and 
significant voice within civil society. In this sense, there are a number of relevant 
theologians, both Protestant and Catholic, who, during the second half of the twentieth 
century, have stressed the political dimension of Christianity. I will introduce, as 
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examples, the insights of two that stand against the modern trend towards the 
privatization of religion. Both grasp the irreducibly political character of Christian faith.  
The political theology delivered by Johann Baptist Metz and Jürgen Moltmann will allow 
us to understand some of the most essential public and political consequences of 
Christianity. The liberationist and redemptive aspect of the story of the God of Abraham 
and the gospel of Jesus Christ may only be understood in collective and mutual terms. 
The story of the Bible and the consequences of Christian faith are far from being 
something private and individual. From a believing point of view, the only way to 
measure the character of the impasse between the public claims of Christianity and 
secular liberalism lies on an accurate appreciation of the universal impetus of Christian 
faith.  
Johann Baptist Metz attempts to build a new framework for fundamental theology 
based on the political consequences of praxis. He develops a “political theology”14 in 
order to emphasize that Christianity cannot hold itself as politically innocent. For Metz 
the trend towards the privatization of religion threatens the very definition of Christian 
theology. Theology, in order to remain significant for the world and faithful to the 
Gospels, must reflect on theodicy, particularly after the horrendous events of the 20th 
century.  Grounding theology in history, Metz aims to deprivatize Christian faith, making 
the eschatological message of Jesus Christ the central focus for Christian theology. The 
starting point for a theology with public implications should be eschatology because 
every Christian has the responsibility to develop her relationship to the world as one of 
hope. 
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Publishing Company, 2007) 
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In Metz’s word, religion must be “interruptive”. Instead of understanding time as 
an unbounded, limitless evolutionistic progress, theology has to bring back the immanent 
biblical-apocalyptic expectation that makes discipleship urgent.  It is in this context that 
memory becomes a fundamental theological-political category for Metz. Memory is a 
constitutive relationship with the past that might bring subversive contents. The memory 
of the suffering becomes solidarity with the dead and the vanquished. A process of 
remembering grasps the promises of the past and gives to the church a public role: the 
opportunity to become a bearer of “dangerous memories”, especially the ones of Jesus. 
The memory of Jesus, as an anamnestic solidarity, shows the conflict between the divine 
promises and history.  Theology for Metz is in itself political: its role relies on fostering a 
consciousness of the struggle for memories of the dead and the suffering. Christian faith 
ought to ask the question of suffering again and again in order to work out an 
eschatological notion of hope.  
Metz’s own words help us to sum up his vision. He claims that the political 
dimension of Christian faith “is a praxis in history and society that understands itself as a 
solidaristic hope in the God of Jesus as the God of the living and the dead, who calls all 
[human beings] to be subjects in God’s presence”15. For Metz, finally, the idea of God is 
itself political: all human beings are subjects before God and this belief requires a fight 
against oppression.   
Jürgen Moltmann also argues for the “economic, social, and political 
consequences of the gospel of the Son of Man who was crucified as a rebel”.16 Moltmann 
aims to raise a theology of the cross as a critique of society, a critique capable of going 
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beyond the dichotomy between church and state. The memory of the passion and 
resurrection of Christ has, for Moltmann, liberationist implications. It brings the church 
into solidarity with the sufferers of her time. The crucified God is the God of the poor, 
the humiliated, and the oppressed.   
Even though Moltmann wrote his Theology of Hope before he wrote The 
Crucified God, he sees the theological foundation for Christian hope in the resurrection of 
the crucified Christ.  In order to be relevant, hope must be founded on remembrance and 
memories of suffering and, in particular, on the story of the cross. It becomes important 
then that the cross bears meaning and hope not only for the church but also for society. 
To maintain that at the heart of Christian faith lies a forsaken, crucified Christ is to make 
a powerful political statement. God raised the crucified God, making him the hope for 
human history. A church faithful to that should break her alliances with the powerful and 
enter into solidarity with the poor. The cry of Christ’s abandonment leads to a theology 
deeply committed to the liberation of the oppressed. Ever since Auschwitz the question of 
God became for Moltmann the question of the cry of the victims for justice17.  
Moltmann embraces the idea of the passibility of God to ground the liberationist 
dimension of the cross of Christ. God forsakes himself because through the cross he 
becomes the Father and God of the godforsaken. God is in passion during the crucifixion, 
active with his own being in the dying with Christ. Suffering the death of his Son, God 
loves forsaken human beings18.  
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Kingdom and Jesus’ own existence after the cross, the cross is no longer permissible in history.  
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3. Religious Reasons and Political Arguments 
 
So far I have presented the challenges that secular liberalism, in one of its most 
influential versions, presents for public religions in a plural world. I have also aimed to 
describe the political dimension of Christian faith in order to show the theological nature 
of that public character.  
In this section I will introduce some nuances to this discussion. I will claim that 
believers should be allowed to make significant use of their religious convictions in the 
public realm, for that is where the identity of individuals and collectives is shaped and 
where the most relevant issues are discussed. When claiming that the Church should not 
renounce its voice in the public conversation I am stating that we must find a third way 
between secular liberalism and the neo-traditionalism developed by authors such as 
Stanley Hauerwas or John Milbank. Both neo-traditionalism and secularism restrain 
religion from participating in the political conversation. Some of the insights offered by 
Jeffrey Stout in Democracy and Tradition will help us to develop this notion of a third 
way. We will also see that the trend towards the privatization of religion seems to be 
founded on some ideological presuppositions. Likewise, unlike the neo-traditionalist 
arguments, I will argue that the Church must not stand as a particular community of 
virtue, against the world, and away from society; but she must contribute to the richness 
of a plural democracy able to incorporate different voices, even religious ones. Making 
her voice heard, the Church contributes to the health of a liberal democracy.  
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Let us recapitulate now the main features that characterize contemporary political 
liberalism. These are (1) the strict separation of Church and State in order to promote 
religious and moral tolerance; (2) the neutrality of the State, which must remain impartial 
regarding the moral-comprehensive convictions of its own citizens: the state is not to 
discriminate against religious convictions; (3) the priority of rights over the good: what 
we owe to one another and what the State owes to its citizens is limited to rights. The 
question about how should we live the good life is removed from the agenda of the 
political realm. Thus, a consequence of liberalism is that religion can prosper only in 
individual but not in the political life per se. Religion becomes largely a private matter.  
In order to protect liberty, equality, tolerance and mutual respect, liberalism ends 
up removing religion from the public sphere and relegating it to private life. But religion, 
and in particular Christianity (as I have already argued), has always held a public 
vocation. In fact, if we analyze the history of many Western countries we will see how 
Christian moral values have been present in the foundation of these societies. In the U.S., 
for example, Christian and biblical imaginary was at the heart of the deliberations on the 
Constitution. 
 Theories of liberal secularism begin with an unfounded and ideological 
assumption that sees secularization as the progressive decline of religious beliefs and 
practices in the modern world. The modern myth that sees history as the evolution from 
superstition to reason, from belief to unbelief, from the sacred to science can be 
challenged.  We often see how contemporary liberal societies become increasingly hostile 
to religion, and we might find some ideological assumptions when pragmatist liberals 
like Rorty understand religion as a “conversation-stopper”.  Secular liberalism affirms 
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that values such as freedom, equality, and toleration are best preserved if religion is 
removed from public affairs. Religion must be confined to the private sphere.  
 Along the same lines, the theories that construe society as having independent 
spheres of meaning, as if they were absolutely impermeable, seem to be flawed and 
founded on ideological assumptions as well. We might find plenty of examples where the 
public and the private meet in the form of associational actions of different individuals or 
collectives. Lincoln founded his argument against slavery on biblical imaginary; Martin 
Luther King did the same regarding segregation. In Chile those who complain when the 
Catholic Church publicly stands against abortion, nevertheless celebrate the role that the 
Church played during Pinochet dictatorship.  The day after Pinochet overthrew Allende, 
the Church founded the “Comité pro Paz” which became afterwards the “Vicaría de la 
Solidaridad”. To the action of that association on behalf of the human rights we owe 
hundreds of lives. A Church-based public initiative founded on religious convictions that 
openly faced dictatorship.   
Often, people who hold religious convictions tend to believe that some of those 
convictions have significant political consequences, while secular liberals assume that 
religious arguments must remain at home. Freedom of religion implies, first of all, liberty 
of conscience, that is to say, the right to make up one’s own mind regarding religion and 
moral questions. But freedom of religion also considers the right to act according to one’s 
own beliefs, as long as they do not interfere with the rights of others. Things get more 
controversial when religious acts and commitments serve for reasons when taking a stand 
on political issues. It seems to be clear that the expression of religious arguments is 
protected under the right of religious freedom and freedom of expression. Still the 
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question remains whether religious reasons play a role –and if they do, which one– when 
discerning political decisions. If religious people use religious reasons that meet the 
criteria of plausibility to back up some of their political positions, there should be no 
reason to restrain the public use of those premises.  
 When religious convictions become political arguments, believers must do their 
best in order to properly justify their arguments. Christianity must be aware of some of 
the basics of public reason: Church reasons given in public should be accessible to all 
reasonable human beings; they must meet basic criteria of public plausibility. This 
statement seems fair to me. But when we enter into the realm of the social contract 
theory, more questions arise. To match “being reasonable” with “supporting a 
freestanding conception of justice” ends up being something not as conceivable as 
liberals like Rawls wanted to be. Particularly because this understanding of “being 
reasonable” implies confining to the private sphere the moral and religious 
comprehensive doctrines that ultimately define who we are. In other words, arguments 
can be reasonable even if they do not meet the Rawlsian criteria of public reason. If 
reason in common only means reaching a freestanding conception of justice, a formal 
political consensus, then the role of religions in the public becomes quite restrictive. 
There have to be more ways to treat fellow citizens as equals than through formal or 
procedural agreements. The fact that democratic societies are called to work upon the 
basis of certain common principles might lead to the misunderstanding of excluding 
religious arguments from public life. This conclusion seems not to take into account the 
spirit of the rights of freedom of conscience, religious freedom and freedom of 
expression. If those rights cannot be exercised in the public conversation, what would be 
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their purpose? If we cannot make substantial use of our religious commitments at the 
center of the public plaza, where the most important issues are discussed, then what is the 
real meaning of religious liberty?  
 To that question, Rawls would respond with what is called “the proviso”, an 
amended view of his idea of public reason.19  According to this revisited version of public 
reason, a citizen might introduce religious arguments for political issues if those 
arguments are supplemented by reasons based on the social contract. Even though this 
version is less restrictive than the former one, I still see that to fulfill the proviso is a 
difficult task.  
 As Nicholas Wolterstorff points out: religious people base their decisions about 
fundamental issues of justice on their religious convictions. It is part of their view of life 
that they ought to allow the word of God or the teachings of Jesus to form not only their 
moral and political convictions but also their entire life. For them religion is not about 
political statements, but is about the way they live. If society does not allow them to 
ground their discernments and decisions on their religious beliefs it would infringe the 
free exercise of their conscience20.  
 To state that offering religious reasons in public conversation is inappropriate 
would imply that there exists an order of reasons that belongs to a neutral, formal field, 
able to be grasped and understood by every human being. I do not see how secular liberal 
reasons, as part of the achievements of Western Modernity, can be more neutral than 
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reasons that belong to different religious or philosophical traditions.21  The idea that all 
the reasons given in public ought to be part of a freestanding, neutral concept of justice 
seems flawed. A truer approach to the notion of mutual respect should allow giving in 
public the reasons that best define who we are, even though they cannot be embraced by 
each one of our interlocutors.  
This being said, I would not go as far as Stanley Hauerwas22 and John Milbank 23 
do in this respect. Even though I see some ideology hidden behind the attempt of 
neutrality of secular liberalism, I would not still follow either the path of the neo-
traditionalists who ground their anti-liberal critique in a private notion of Christian 
charity, radical discipleship or Aristotelian virtue. Some aspects of secularization, like the 
church/state division, have proven to be helpful even to Christianity. To be faithful to 
one’s convictions does not necessarily entail being uninvolved in the politics of our 
democracies and being involved only in the polity that is the church.  The church should 
not be only a “contrast model” but a contributor to the construction of common goals and 
ends, based on justice and respect. An understanding of religious tradition as a 
community of virtue that must stand against the rest of the world seems largely 
incompatible with democratic citizenship. Throughout the next chapter I hope to develop, 
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following Taylor, a revisionist version of liberalism able to recover a richer, and more 
comprehensive view of human agency, all the while remaining committed to liberty, 
equality, and mutual respect.  
 Drawing on Hegel, Jeffrey Stout24 wishes to prove that norms and democracy are 
the outcome of a social progress where members of a community achieve mutual 
recognition. Instead of a social contract as the basis of social cooperation, Hegel places a 
dialectical reasonableness. Norms are not constituted at the contractual level, but in a 
process of mutual recognition. Norms are social creatures.  We will explore in the next 
chapter how an understanding of the meaning of democratic practices based on Hegelian 
thought might be more hospitable to religion than the Kantian social-contract tradition.  
 Stout develops a pragmatism deeply embedded in both the Hegelian tradition and 
in Emersionan expressivism and Deweyan pragmatism.  He places his work as a third 
way between traditionalism and the liberal contractarian program of restraint (of 
comprehensive schemes). Both traditionalism and secular liberalism, Stout sustains, hold 
that democratic culture “implicitly requires the policing or self-censorship of religious 
expression in the political arena”.25 At the same time, he argues that the ethical life of 
democracies calls for expressive freedom of the particular views of the members of the 
community precisely where they gather, i.e. in the public sphere.   
 That is why Stout disagrees with Richard Rorty, who is probably the most 
important of the pragmatists, when the latter refers to religion as a conversation-stopper. 
According to Rorty, religion can only flourish in private life; in fact, religious reasons are 
so private that they cannot even be brought into the public conversation. That argument 
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takes us to a very limited position: we can share in public only those premises that people 
already hold in common. It seems hard to see the rationale of this argument, especially 
when Rorty distances himself from Habermas and Rawls. But, as Stout points out, it 
reflects the mainstream of the Western-Enlightened political culture. When someone is 
publicly expressing some of the contents of the faith she holds, she is not necessarily 
imposing her beliefs over her interlocutor; she is just communicating who she is.  
However, the fact that she believes does not mean that she is able to offer a rationale of 
her belief. In order to keep the conversation going, religious people ought to be able to 
elaborate some justification of their beliefs. Besides there are many other non-religious 
commitments and convictions that, when publically expressed that also create discursive 
impasses when they are not capable of offering reasons.  
 
4. Secularization and its Different Voices 
 
To conclude this chapter I will offer an evaluation of some of the diversity of 
voices that refer to the process of secularization. Here I intend to contextualize liberal 
secularism in a wider perspective: secularization has somehow framed the relationship 
between the Church and society throughout modernity. This section aims to serve as a 
bridge between this chapter and the next one. Charles Taylor will show how 
secularization is an ambiguous concept. Paul Valadier argues that secularization is not 
totally foreign to Catholicism; rather it finds some of its origin in Christian theology. 
William Connelly defends a public ethos more tolerant to religious faith and moral 
convictions than traditional secularism. Finally, for Jeffrey Stout, a public conversation 
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functions under the limits of secularism when its participants do not take for granted God 
(or another ultimate moral source) as a common ground.  Secularism should not 
necessarily entail religious disenchantment.  
The concept of secularization seems to be quite ambiguous. It designates several 
different experiences. The eight hundred pages long Charles Taylor A Secular Age 
decisively proves this.   
Here Taylor explores the Christian roots of our era and the widening range of 
spiritual and religious alternatives available to believers and non-believers in our time. In 
order to do this he provides a narrative of the development of these multiples options 
starting from the sixteenth century. A Secular Age aims to describe the historical process 
which ends up sketching the map of the spiritual-religious world in North-Atlantic 
civilization. One question frames the entire quest of the book: “Why was it virtually 
impossible not to believe in God in, say, 1500 in our Western society, while in 2000 
many of us find this not only easy, but even inescapable?”26 Taylor develops three 
meanings under the notion of secularization: (1) the church/state separation and the 
division of spheres: while the public space must remain neutral in order to respect 
equality, the private realm constitutes the place for particular substantive schemes; (2) the 
decay of religious belief and practice: fewer people go to church today; and (3) a change 
in the conditions of belief: how did we get from the enchanted, hierarchical worldview, 
governed by the divine, to a disenchanted worldview characterized by instrumental 
reason and exclusive humanism. Even though Taylor pays attention to these three 
interrelated approaches to secularization, he focus his attention on the third: 
Secularization emerges when a self-sufficient humanism –a humanism with no goal other 
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than human flourishing on this side of history– becomes available not only for the élites, 
but also for the masses. We will return to this topic in the last chapter. We will see how in 
recovering the potentiality of hope, as human flourishing on this side of history but in 
continuity with the next, Christianity can make one of its main political contributions. 
Taylor rejects the unilinear secularization narrative as science replacing faith. Instead he 
suggests another model which depends on what alternatives are available. The pattern of 
secularization is one of destabilization and recomposition, a complex and nuanced 
process made in several stages. Everyone can see that there have been declines in practice 
and explicit belief in many countries, especially in the last four decades. It is clear that 
God is not present in the public realm as in past centuries, but how to understand and 
interpret these changes may not be that evident. Taylor probably wishes to demonstrate 
that perhaps there is no such decline in belief; that what has faded has been our images of 
the golden era of religion. But if we include the current wide range of spiritual and semi-
spiritual beliefs, religion has not declined. If we see religion as the shape of our ultimate 
concerns, then religion seems to be alive in the “age of authenticity”.  
In its origins, after the religious wars of the 16th century, liberal secularism arises 
as probably the best hope for a peaceful and just world. Issues such as the meaning of 
life, faith, salvation and damnation, and the divine source or morality were pulled out of 
the public life and deposited into private life. This new trend towards the secularization 
of the public was seen as a crucial shift calculated to protect freedom, tolerance, rights, 
and the primacy of the State. Yet, secularization also came about to protect the free 
exercise of religion. This is probably the ultimate meaning of John Locke’s Letter 
Concerning Toleration. 
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Paul Valadier27 defends the seemingly paradoxical thesis that the Catholic Church 
has contributed to the development of secularization, even when opposed to it. In some 
way, democracy and secularization has been strengthened by its Catholic opposition, 
even though Secularization is contrary to the universal impetus of Christianity.  
Modern secularization is quite linked with the principle of the autonomy of the 
moral subject which brings to the fore the notion of independence, freedom, and rights. 
And the gospels, even though, they defend the value of the human person also defend its 
profound bound with the community, and therefore with others. The whole notion of 
covenant comes up to strengthen this assumption. We cannot get into the idea of 
Christian salvation if we see it as a personal/individual salvation. On the contrary, the 
Christian notion of charity, as the link between love of God, love of others, and proper 
love of self, certainly runs against the Enlightened notion of the total autonomy of moral 
conscience, or the absolute independence of the individual. Obviously, the Catholic 
Church has not wished to advance a doctrine that ends up fostering secularization. Quite 
the opposite, she has she has acknowledged only reluctantly to some of the modern 
achievements such as the scientific discourse, the notion of human rights, and the 
sovereignty of the modern States.  
But, where does the contribution of Catholicism to secularization lay according to 
Valadier? Firstly, it is the Christian doctrine that first opened the door to scientific 
discourse. Since the God of the Bible totally transcends the world, the world is open to 
human stewardship. Thus it is part of human beings’ responsibility to manage the 
creation.  Secondly, it was the Church who first introduced a new relationship between 
temporal and spiritual affairs, defending the primacy of the latter over the former. 
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Whereas the task of the Church consisted in providing spiritual means for eternal 
salvation, the duty of the princes relied on running the affairs of earthly life. Thirdly, and 
this is a point where Taylor would very much agree with Valadier, the modern trend 
towards dignity, freedom, and equality of every human being finds its roots in Christian 
heritage. The Catholic Church, faithful to the Gospel, has always defended the notion of 
the dignity of the human person. Yet Taylor insists throughout his work that, 
paradoxically, some of the most impressive extensions of gospel ethics, such as universal 
solidarity and the affirmation of the value of ordinary life, depended on the dissolution of 
Christendom. We will deepen in this point in the next chapter. 
Religions in general and the Catholic Church in particular might help to protect, 
strengthen, and foster some of the values that democratic regimes regard as most 
significant. In fact, liberal democracies, as I have been arguing, are far from being 
politically or ethically neutral. The respect of human dignity and tolerance, the priority of 
liberty, equality and solidarity are all values frequently supported by religious 
institutions. Communities of faith tend to unveil the symbolic foundations of such values, 
which often have a religious provenance. The Catholic Church –through the documents 
of Medellín and Puebla, through Liberation Theology and through the ecclesiology of 
Christian Base Communities– has strongly fostered in Latin America the struggle for a 
just society for all, especially for the poor. Furthermore, communities of faith may play 
another significant role precisely because they are suspicious of some of the 
consequences of the modern ideology of progress. It seems today that progress, as such, 
is good for the life of human beings. We witness a number of threats to life made in the 
name of reason that can be challenged by living communities of faith, such as nuclear 
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bombs or certain developments in genetics and biology. Reason must be subject of being 
stimulated or even questioned by different symbolic and ethical frameworks.  
William E. Connolly28 introduces some critiques of the ideology of secularism as 
well.  He defends an ideal of public life modified to strengthen the perspective of 
minorities. Secularism should be refashioned in order to become more tolerant to 
religion, as well as more capable of embracing a variety of moral, communal, and 
different kind of faiths. We need to learn how to cultivate a public ethos of engagement 
in which a wider variety of perspectives finds some room. Liberal secularism in its strict 
separation of spheres ends up threatening the notion of a more vibrant and open 
pluralism. “Several variants of secularism kill two birds with one stone: as they try to seal 
public life from religious doctrines they also cast out a set of non-theistic orientations 
toward reverence, ethics, and public life that deserve to be heard”29.  What Connelly is 
pointing out is that social life and democracy would benefit when a more generous ethos 
of engagement between multiple voices has a place in society, taking intersubjectivism 
more seriously. Even though there are numerous connections, for this author neither 
secularism nor liberalism is entirely reducible to the other. We find some theological 
liberalism as we might find non-liberal secularisms. John Rawls fits in the category of a 
secular liberal. His radical separation between the private and the public makes his 
philosophy deaf to the multiplicity of voices subsisting under the freestanding conception 
of justice.   
Connelly sees secularism as a Euro-American modus vivendi that has tried to 
determine the scope and the limits of the public sphere. His problems with secularism are 
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related to the secular tendency to ignore and devalue religious, metaphysical, gender, 
ethnic, and sexual differences. Having pushed Christianity into a private existence, 
secularism now consolidates flat conceptions of ethics, and public life.30  
Liberal secularism draws a picture of public sphere that has become quite 
hegemonic in the West. For Jeffrey Stout, secularization does not necessarily entails 
disenchantment or loss of religious belief. An ethical discourse is secularized when 
people engaging in public discourse offer arguments that do not look for agreement in 
substantial matters such as the existence of God or the eternal life.  This mean that in 
some circumstances it would sound very inappropriate to give theological or 
comprehensive reasons in front of religiously diverse audience. Thus, Stout continues, 
“An ethical discourse in religiously plural democracies is secularized […] only in the 
sense that it does not take for granted a set of agreed-upon assumptions about the nature 
and existence of God”31. In other words, religious arguments no longer have any sort of 
default authority, even though those who defend them could be rationally entitled to those 
religious commitments.   
Can liberalism be compatible with a socially constituted self, a community-based 
notion of shared ends, and a conception of the good adequate to a pluralist society? Can it 
thus be hospitable to the contributions of communities of faith? How do we form a 
community able to find a common ground, while still respecting the community’s 
irreducible heterogeneity? The next chapter will address these questions. 
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II. A revisionist conception of liberalism: Charles Taylor and social goods.  
 
Having introduced a description of the political and universal claims of 
Christianity, on the one hand, and one of the most influential versions of political 
liberalism, on the other, I aimed to stress the contrast between a public morality that 
seeks to protect pluralism on the basis of a procedural agreement and Christian faith and 
its political nature as the drive to confer certain order to society on the basis of its own 
theology. I believe that an appropriate interpretation of the philosophy of Charles Taylor 
can offer an alternative: both respectful of individual liberty, equality, and mutual respect 
and, at the same time, more hospitable to the contribution of religious and comprehensive 
doctrines in general to the public conversation.  
Whereas many secular liberals claim neutrality at the origin of the liberal values 
(freedom, equality, and tolerance), I tend to see them as at least partly, historically and 
socially conditioned and embedded. Borrowing Sandel’s expression: the self is 
encumbered in a more dramatic way than secular liberals are capable of recognizing.  
 The Catholic Church has resisted an individualistic interpretation of the individual 
person, constantly insisting that the person exists only within a community –beginning 
with the very basic community of human language, without which humanization would 
be impossible. This dialogical feature of the human condition reminds us that self-
fulfilment seems impossible without regard for the demands of our ties with others and 
for the demands which emanate from something more than human desire.  The twin ideas 
that (1) human beings are always dialogically shaped and, in some way, always bound to 
their community and (2) that human fulfilment is to be found beyond purely human 
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categories are two Christian notions that deeply underlie Taylor’s philosophy. Taylor’s 
overall thought seems to me quite Catholic and can thus help in the search for moral 
grounds for a public theology in a plural world. 
 I believe that some of the moral insights offered by Taylor might help theology to 
re-imagine itself in a world that seems to be characterized by an experience of absence 
and void or, rather, that seems to be looking for ways to avoid this sense of absence so 
common to instrumental rationality. Instead of the post-liberal and countercultural 
theology of, for instance, Stanley Hauerwas, I tend to think that a Catholic theology 
faithful to its own tradition should engage contemporary challenges directly. That is why 
a revisionist version of liberalism able to recognize its ties with some particular goods –
those that have a significant Christian background, as I will try to prove later on– is so 
important for bringing back the contribution of religions to society. Human agency gets 
narrower when modern societies marginalize from the public discourse analogical and 
symbolic approaches to Truth, Justice, and the Good. The whole Catholic ritual tradition 
that embraces some of the most significant aspects of life through metaphor, sacraments 
and analogies, might help to bring back to public life the fullness of human experience so 
often narrowed by instrumental and disengaged rationalities. A theology in dialogue with 
contemporary morality can lead the public discussion beyond concepts such as economic 
development and technical progress, thus allowing a new awareness of the narratives that 
bring a sense of belonging to our communities. We need new forms of theological and 
political imagination based on what ultimately drives our sense of solidarity, justice, and 
benevolence. We need new forms of religious tolerance not necessarily inscribed in 
neutral/procedural secularism but consciously anchored in the ties that bind people 
 44 
together in society. We will see how liberty, equality, and solidarity are somehow 
substantive goods and values that constitute a significant part of the identity of the (late) 
modern subject.  
 While keeping a strong commitment to liberty, equality, and mutual respect I 
hope to offer a fuller and richer understanding of human life, one that better accounts for 
human identity by including categories such as symbolic memory, a hermeneutic of the 
past, a communal and cultural belonging, and religious faith.  A version of human agency 
grounded on such concepts resonates in some sense with other descriptions of the self, 
which from different perspectives, coincide in their critique of formal liberalism: namely, 
the encumbered self (Sandel)32, the pilgrim self (Thiemann)33 and the porous self 
(Taylor)34.  
 This chapter will consider some of the most significant aspects of Taylor’s 
philosophy developed throughout his entire corpus. I will claim, basically, that some 
aspects of his critique of modernity might help us to reframe the question for the place 
and the role of religious convictions in a secular liberal world. I aim to prove that 
Taylor’s ethics offers some moral grounds that make modernity much more hospitable to 
religion and comprehensive schemes in general.  
 Six sections comprise this chapter. An overall view of Taylor’s narrative will 
allow us to understand that, instead of offering a philosophical system, Taylor tells the 
story of the development of the modern identity at the moral and spiritual level. Sections 
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two and three critique some of the individualistic and instrumental aspects of modern 
thought, and offer instead a vision of a broader ethics. Sections four and five play a 
crucial role in this thesis as they explore the irreducible social character of modern goods 
showing their Christian lineage. Finally, section six will attempt to demonstrate that the 
place where public religions must develop their insights is the scope of civil society.  
 
1. Charles Taylor’s Moral Narrative  
 
 According to Taylor, liberal secularism, as perhaps the dominant public moral in 
the West, seems to be part of a larger cultural transformation. A brief approach to the 
narrative style of Taylor’s two major works (Sources of the Self and A Secular Age) 
offers a preliminary idea of his overall thought and helps us to contextualize the ethical 
arguments that I will introduce further on in this chapter. In spite of his gigantic work, 
Taylor does not offer a philosophical system. Rather his style seems to be more like a 
nuanced narrative. In this first section I aim to situate the coming discussions in the midst 
of a wider story that shows how the characteristics of modern morality are, actually, 
features of the development of the modern identity.  
 In Sources of the Self and A Secular Age, maybe more than in any other article or 
essay, Taylor reveals his Hegelian pedigree by reading history as the overcoming of 
contradictions. Both books are constantly unfolding the internal contradictions that drive 
history within historical processes. Taylor’s style and method is not the modern history of 
philosophical, sociological, or theological theories. Rather this philosopher tells the story 
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of what he calls “social imaginaries”35, namely, the way ordinary people see, imagine, 
and understand themselves in a given period of time within the societies they inhabit and 
sustain. Social Imaginaries are different from social theories since they are something 
“much broader and deeper than the intellectual schemes people may entertain when they 
think about social reality in a disengaged mode”36. It is interesting to note that whereas a 
social theory is shared just by small minority of intellectuals a social imaginary is 
something shared by larger groups of people.  
 Taylor sees the major changes of modernity taking place at the moral and spiritual 
level rather than at the epistemological one. History is, therefore, a lived experience, an 
account of our worldviews. Thus, this philosopher looks to discover the moral conditions 
that made some ways of life possible.  This attempt is particularly strong in A Secular 
Age where, showing the complexity of human processes, Taylor will try to avoid those 
unilinear and unchallenged explanations of history that end up homogenizing human 
agency. He is interested in discover “how our sense of things, our cosmic imaginary, in 
other words, our whole background understanding and feel of the world has been 
transformed”37. Hence secularization, instead of a philosophical or sociological theory, 
comes across as a gradual fading of faith at the level of imagination. That is why arts, 
poetry, literature, and personal experiences of several figures are so important in his 
narrative. A moral and spiritual view of modernity retrieves the constellation of different 
understandings of nature, person, society, the Good, and God.  In this sense atheism gives 
the impression of being a process of transformation in moral sensibility instead of an 
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epistemological crisis. That is why the question Taylor addresses in A Secular Age is, 
ultimately, how ordinary people came to imagine human flourishing without God.  
 The first half of A Secular Age looks into the process which led the West from a 
unified Christian world during the Middle Ages towards the 20th century when a self-
sufficient humanism became available to masses of people. The author traces the 
emergence of a “buffered self”, a self-enclosed subject, shut to transcendence, the 
opposite of the previous “porous self”. The entire book presents a complex and nuanced 
exploration of the development of the moral, cultural, and social conditions for the 
possibility of belief and throughout the last chapters the author offers his version of the 
spiritual density of the present time. The final part of the book sketches the map of 
contemporary spiritual alternatives under the name of “Conditions of Belief”.  
 The modern moral order is described by Taylor as fundamentally an ethic of 
freedom and mutual benefit, both as coessential concepts. This morality of mutual benefit 
takes place between autonomous individuals, free agents who look for increasing life and 
the means of life through rights that are to be assured to all persons equally. The self 
becomes dominated by instrumental rationality and secular time. It is the natural order 
driven by science and disengaged reason where we live and develop our imaginaries and 
beliefs. Taylor, deconstructing the unchallenged, naturalized ethics behind modern 
epistemology, finds there an ethics of independence, self-responsibility, progress, and 
control. And this is probably one of the major claims underneath Taylor’s entire corpus.  
This philosophy targets the mainstream narrative that shapes what he calls “the immanent 
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frame”38. Taylor subjects this narrative to dialectical analysis throughout A Secular Age 
and, indeed, throughout his whole corpus.  
 However, the interesting point is that secular humanism is not the whole story of 
western modernity. The sacred is somewhere present in the culture of authenticity and 
expressive individualism. We live between “cross pressures,”39 a movement of mutual 
fragilization between materialism and (orthodox forms of) religion that generate new 
forms of spiritual life that end up destabilizing the old ways of belief. The outcome of 
these cross pressures is a much more fragmented and fragile religious landscape than ever 
before, a landscape that displays diverse alternatives for fullness. New forms of belief 
that attempt to rescue the body and rehabilitate human desire emerge against the 
hegemony of calculating reason and against the “higher” demands of Christian ascetism.  
 We will see in this second chapter how Taylor disagrees with the modern thesis 
that states that religion will disappear or will become just a private matter. Taylor’s 
thought generally opposes the biased, conventional, antireligious narrative quite popular 
in the developed world. The conditions of belief have not faded but have radically 
changed.  Instead of suppression Taylor sees rather a redefinition of the categories of 
belief in western democratic societies. Ultimately, his critique of secular liberalism is part 
of a wider critique of some aspects of the modern identity.  
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2. Charles Taylor’s Critique to Formal Liberalism 
 
 The argument I now introduce finds its modern roots in certain differences 
between Hegel’s ethics and Kant’s morality. This contrast portrays an essential moral 
distinction and plays a critical role in relation to the argument of this thesis. It somehow 
redraws the borderline between the private and the public and introduces a different 
concept of both ethical life and the public realm. I will claim here that there is much more 
continuity between ontological propositions and normative arguments than secular 
liberals are willing to admit. Since our political arguments are not only a matter of 
reaching consensus but also a matter of personal identity, religious reasons cannot be 
marginalized and relegated to a somehow fictitious private realm. What we claim in the 
public realm is a consequence of what we are. And what we are is not something 
developed only in private, but also developed in the encounter with others.  
 Whereas Kant rooted society in a contract celebrated among autonomous rational 
agents, Hegel argued that social contract theory lacks an appropriate account of history 
and social practices as a fundamental element of society. The origin of social norms is not 
to be found, according to Hegel, in the practical rationality of individuals committing 
themselves to a formal social contract. Rather, social norms emerge from social practices, 
from a shared ethical life where, in mutual recognition of other’s consciousness, 
subjectivity and rationality are shaped by the interaction of the individuals that participate 
in society. 
 Jeffrey Stout retrieves this Hegelian tradition that understands ethical norms as 
socially instituted because he grounds his pragmatist account of democracy as tradition in 
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this Hegelian conception of the formation of ethical norms.40 What I find helpful in this 
view is that it allows ethical life to be part of politics. In fact, democratic norms are 
ethically and socially formed. Thus, instead of the already-shaped-in-private identity of 
an independent, autonomous rational being, who goes to the public sphere just to build a 
rational, procedural, universally grounded agreement, we see an identity –a self-
consciousness– that is ultimately shaped in the social encounter. In this sense, Hegel’s 
notion of sittlichkeit (ethical-social life; civil society) seems to me much more hospitable 
to comprehensive schemes, and therefore to religions, that Kant’s moralität (deontology).  
 One of the most celebrated passages of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit lies in 
what he calls “the struggle for recognition.”41 Here he explores the necessary conditions 
for any form of consciousness as mutual recognition. Self-consciousness implies 
awareness of the fact that one’s identity is always dialogically shaped. A subject becomes 
individual when it is recognized by the other. Individuals that form a community see each 
other as equals and different from themselves, in a reciprocal relationship. Mutual 
recognition (Annerkennung) provides the matrix within which individual self-
consciousness can exist as such.  
 In his famous “master/slave” dialectic, Hegel intended to typify certain features of 
“the struggle for recognition.” The conflict between the master and the slave represents 
the historical themes of dominance and obedience, dependence and independence. 
Adequate recognition requires a mirroring of the self through the other so as to overcome 
asymmetry.  
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 This notion has been retrieved by a number of contemporary authors in the field 
of political thought42 and it, I believe, undergirds Taylor’s philosophy in a significant 
way. In my reading, I see something critical vis-à-vis the place and the role of religion 
(and comprehensive ethical and aesthetic schemes in general) in this theory of 
Annerkennung. Religion and comprehensive schemes cannot be removed from the public 
sphere because they are not something developed in the private life of an already-shaped 
identity, but they are something that appears and exists in social and mutual recognition 
through ethical life.  
 Taking into account this tradition, I see why Taylor does not feel comfortable 
with Rawls’ political liberalism and particularly with the idea of overlapping consensus. 
Taylor is committed to the liberal values of liberty, equality, and the theory of basic 
rights. However, he believes that these values can flourish only in a particular kind of 
society, where some pre-conditions allow for the fulfillment of those liberal interests. He 
thinks that a person becomes really human by interaction with others, arguing that a 
subject makes choices within a particular society which has to be promoted. Hence, there 
is no chance for individual rights outside a human community based on some constitutive 
and collective (i.e., non-decomposable) goods. 
 Rawls identifies the fact of pluralism with identities and comprehensive schemes 
that are already constituted and shaped in a space previous to the political domain. Thus, 
individuals or collectives with their particular identities would go to the public field in 
order to dispute about the truth of their propositions and in order to build up political 
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consensus. Following Hegel’s notion of Sittlichkeit, Taylor tends to disagree with this 
assertion. He defends instead a concept of politics as the place where people go in order 
to demand recognition of the Lebenswelt they champion. This alternative understanding 
of politics as embedded in a diverse tradition sees politics, not as the scope where citizens 
present their truth claims, but as the place where the identity of the members of the 
society is shaped by mutual recognition.43  
 In an article named “Cross-purposes: the Liberal-Communitarian Debate”44, 
Taylor suggests that this debate results form some misunderstandings: namely, a 
confusion between ontological issues and advocacy (normative) issues. Ontological 
issues “concern the terms you accept as ultimate in the order of explanation”45. 
Normative issues “concern the moral stand or policy one adopts”46. The relationship 
between both concepts is complex: even though they belong to a different order of 
reasons, they are not independent. An ontological position often grounds the view one 
advocates.  An ontological position may support several normative propositions and a 
normative proposition may not be compatible with every ontological position. I find these 
distinctions not only methodologically clear, but also philosophically helpful. They raise 
some questions for Rawls’ political liberalism.  
 Whereas Taylor argues that an ontological proposition defines a gamut of 
normative or advocacy positions, Rawls asserts that an independent political conception 
of justice can overlap with a number of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. While 
Taylor holds that a normative position is based on an ontological proposition (every 
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normative debate implies, ultimately, an ontological debate), Rawls affirms that political 
conceptions are independent from ontological views and are able to be overlap with every 
comprehensive doctrine as long as they are reasonable.  
 The problem with the idea of overlapping consensus rests on the gap that Rawls 
introduces between comprehensive and political doctrines. This distinction might take the 
work of the later Rawls to a kind of philosophical blindness before the particular nature 
of human identity. The substitution of reasonability for truth avoids the problem of 
identity and recognition. It works only for a formal conception of politics and justice, but 
not for a more substantive approach to those notions. Whereas Rawls ends up introducing 
a radical distinction between the self and her political purposes, the identity of a human 
being seems to me indivisible from the ends she pursues because those ends are an 
essential part of the definition of the identity of that particular individual.  This is why the 
Rawlsian division between a freestanding political conception of justice and moral 
doctrines seems implausible.  Moreover, I believe that ontological propositions are 
compatible with normative liberal conceptions. It would be perfectly possible for a liberal 
community to engage in particular values. In fact, instead of remaining neutral, 
procedural and deontological liberalism seems to be a particular comprehensive doctrine 
willing to give more weight to some principles and ethical-political values than others. 
Liberalism seems to be far from being purely formal and neutral; rather it is the outcome 
of a particular cultural development. It is a form of morality.  
 In my reading, the fundamental question concerns the content and sense of the 
public sphere and challenges the frontier between the public and the private. Even though 
we can (and must) separate the government from religious institutions as a basic 
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democratic principle, it is much more complicated to divide religion and politics. 
Following the idea that the concept of the public must go beyond government, I tend to 
think that the public sphere is not only the place where citizens go to verify the rationality 
of their political conception of justice; not only the place where we design public 
policies; but also the place where individuals and collectives encounter themselves in a 
permanent definition and redefinition of their identities, frequently shaped by the 
recognition that comes from others. The public domain is the place where different 
horizons of meaning meet and where different conceptions of the good and the beautiful 
(either morally or religiously grounded) mutually permeate and redefine. 
 Taylor goes deeper in his critique to liberalism as a morality grounded on the 
social contract theory. Under the name of “atomism”47 he places not only the 17th century 
doctrines of social contract but also all the theories that somehow give priority to the 
individual and her rights over society or that see society in a purely instrumental means to 
fulfill the needs of the individual. The doctrine of the primacy of rights has been 
profoundly influential in modern political imaginaries.  
 According to Taylor there is something very fundamental missing in the 
understanding of society as the sum of atoms. Some views of human agency give critical 
significance to the freedom to choose one’s own mode of life. But for this author the 
doctrine of the primacy of the rights cannot be independent from some considerations 
about what is to be a human being or what is to be part of a human community. Human 
beings “cannot develop the fullness of their moral autonomy –that is the capacity to form 
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independent moral convictions– outside a political culture sustained by institutions of 
political participation and guarantees of personal independence”48.  
 The whole idea of being an autonomous agent is part of a particular identity, a 
way of understanding ourselves, with which human beings are not born. It is an identity 
that human beings have to acquire. And the only way to do it seems to be through 
common practices in common life. Therefore, the Enlightened, free, and autonomous 
individual can keep her moral status only in a certain kind of society where those values 
are considered worth fostering.   
 Taylor develops his social thesis beginning with the very basic community 
coming from human language, without which humanization would be impossible. There 
is no private language. Even before the individual there is something already shared. The 
same thesis that I have sketched earlier (individual identity is partly defined by the 
encounter with others, and not only privately) applies here. The idea of the social contract 
is in some way a flawed notion, since the self cannot exist in isolation. Human language 
is therefore something irreducible. Ultimately, these issues about political participation 
run deep. They concern not only the way human beings live together, but they touch on 
the nature of human life. Taylor places himself in a third way between individual 
freedom and common good. He defends freedom, but as something socially constituted.  
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3. Against Moral Reductionism 
 
In this next section, I wish to demonstrate how significant the distinction is 
between formal morality and ethics (ethical life) for the place and role of religions in a 
pluralistic society. In the essay “Iris Murdoch and Moral Philosophy”,49 Taylor criticizes 
the tendency, in the field of analytic philosophy, toward narrowness in certain issues 
related to moral philosophy. Instead of asking what is good to be or what is good to love, 
the focus of analytic philosophy is on obligatory action, on what we ought to do. But 
what happens in those situations where not just actions are involved but ways of life or 
ways of being? 
The question about how to restore the wider focus of moral philosophy seems to 
be critical when we think in terms of the public role of religions. A challenging task 
remains in discerning how to enhance the scope of morality, including some notions of 
the good life, without threatening our commitments to liberty, equality, and mutual 
respect as some of the most important achievements of modernity. The search for a 
“revisionist” version of liberalism, compatible with a “socially constituted self,” “a 
community-based notion of virtue,” and “a conception of the good adequate to a 
pluralistic society” (developed by Ronald Thiemann in Religion in Public Life) might 
help us to frame the idea of a wider version of ethics suitable to liberal values.  
Taylor detects a certain narrowness when liberal secularism removes the question 
of what is good from the public discussion. Iris Murdoch, Taylor maintains, takes the 
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consideration of a good “which would go beyond life,”50 as a good whose “goodness 
cannot be entirely explained in terms of its contributing to a fuller, better, richer, more 
satisfying human life. It is a good that, sometimes, we might more appropriately respond 
to in suffering and death rather than in fullness and life.”51 Taylor, on the other hand, 
aims to foster a liberation from narrow morality to broader ethics by introducing an even 
wider question: “What commands our fullest love?”  
“We are trapped in the corral of morality”, according to Taylor, and we need to go 
beyond the unconditional. Part of the problem comes from the modern epistemological 
turn. Ever since Descartes, we have put our trust in a method or a procedure of operation 
which conforms to a “disengaged reason,” able to turn on its own proceedings and 
examine them for accuracy. Taylor sees in the rigor and clarity of instrumental reason 
part of the enormous success of Rawls’ philosophy: it proved that rigorous, formal and 
unconditioned modes of reasoning can be used in moral and politics. Therefore, justice 
(and the right) gains primacy over issues of fulfillment and good life partly because 
calculability simplifies the work of morality.  
Modernity has made epistemology central and questions about good life are 
declared insoluble (and therefore private) while questions of justice and fairness can be 
treated by adopting a rational method of discernment. Thus liberal secularism asserts that 
political society must give everyone the space to develop her own goals rather than 
espousing one view or another of the good life. This principle has shown itself to be 
successful in respecting individual rights and its defense is widely accepted, even for 
Taylor. Still, he believes that not all moral deliberations can be developed by a calculus 
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of obligated action. That would amount to another illusion— of what he calls “single-
term moralities.” Do we not need ethical deliberation about what is good in order to know 
how to make a choice in certain circumstances? Taylor addresses this question with the 
idea of “constitutive goods.”52  
 
4. Constitutive Social Goods 
 
So far I have been attempting to prove that an understanding of ethics such as the 
one developed by Taylor might offer some moral grounds able to support the contribution 
of religions to public life. In this regard, the notion of social goods constitutes a crucial 
milestone. Bringing back to political life a dialogical dimension of human agency –
instead of the individualistic view introduced by social contract theories– communities of 
faith can aspire again to contribute in the formation of some common values and ends.  In 
this sense Christianity can provide an invaluable contribution to human life. When a 
notion of limitless scientific progress, incapable of considering values such as human 
good, comes across as an unchallenged reality, the Catholic Church faces the opportunity 
to re-establish a wider and deeper discussion about the future of humankind. An 
understanding of the good as having not only value for the individual, but as something 
irreducibly common matches with some of the most important aspects of Christian 
anthropology.  
Among the many differences between Taylor and Rawls we find some interesting 
coincidences: both are committed to the defense of liberty, equality, tolerance, and 
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solidarity; and both propose their philosophy, in part, as a critique of utilitarianism. The 
divergence resides in Taylor’s view of the foundation of modern moral philosophy. At 
the origin of modern moral philosophy, he identifies a new area that he names, as we 
have seen, “atomism.” 53 Through this concept, Taylor wants to demonstrate that, at the 
basis of utilitarianism, welfarism, and the theories of social contract, there are goods that 
are ultimately “decomposable.” According to utilitarianism, all the goods are individual 
or have value for the individual and according to the theories of social contract, the 
society is born in order to protect freedom and private property, both as individual goods. 
It is against this deep assumption, in which goods are understood as individual assets, that 
Taylor develops his theory of public, social, and non-decomposable goods.  
If we trace this notion of constitutive goods through Taylor’s corpus we will find 
that though having different names, each one of them refers to the very same reality: 
“convergent,” “constitutive,” “irreducible,” and “social” goods. Goods that are not only 
collectively secured but also those we cannot get in any other way-- goods that are 
socially provided and that no individual could afford by herself.  A conversation, for 
instance, is not the coordination of actions of different individuals but a common action 
in a strong, irreducible sense. Constitutive goods exist because they have been articulated 
in some way. Human rights, for instance, exist because of the following factors: 1) they 
have been promulgated; 2) thinkers have theorized about them; 3) struggles have been 
engaged in their favor; 4) people have created different means to assure their 
implementation and so on. Language and articulation are necessary conditions for the 
possibility of the existence of goods.  
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Constitutive goods are, for Taylor, moral sources because they invite individuals 
to configure their lives according to their content. These are goods that make some 
reference to a determinate order of things that articulates the search for a good life. 
Constitutive goods “are things that we love” and not only theories.  
Even though they might be associated with a metaphysical outlook, they belong to 
modern humanistic ethics as well. In ancient and medieval times, constitutive goods were 
an important component of theistic and metaphysical ethics. That does not mean they are 
an insignificant element of modern ethics. In fact, in humanistic ethics the locus for this 
kind of goods moved onto human beings themselves.  
The notion of constitutive goods goes beyond the approach of moral as a theory of 
obligatory action. According to Taylor, deontological morality is itself grounded on 
certain life goods such as freedom, universal justice, equality of some sort, and respect of 
diversity.  The same kind of good is to be found underlying Kant’s defense of the dignity 
of human life and even underlying the categorical imperative. Its second version provides 
a good sample: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person 
or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a 
means to an end.54”  
Dignity, the value of rationality, freedom, and respect for human life reinforce the 
ethical awareness of modernity. They define why human beings deserve our respect when 
they are the objects of our actions. In this sense, modern deontological morality seems to 
be ultimately at the service of some irreducible social goods. Taylor goes even further 
when he claims that we define the content of those goods by clarifying what is worth 
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fostering of the human potential. Therefore, behind the narrow morality of obligatory 
action or the freestanding conception of justice there are some ontological features of 
human life that are being embraced.  
Moralität misses, then, some of the basic articulations that help human beings to 
define what they want to be and discern how to move toward it. “The fullness of ethical 
life involves not just doing, but also being; and not just these two but also loving what is 
constitutively good.” 55 In this sense, constitutive goods would be part of a background 
not always recognized in modernity.   
Some of the procedures we use and the norms that rule our lives may only be 
understood in the context of acquired habits and paradigms that partially define who we 
are. Ethical life becomes a place of articulation for our identity, of what we love, and of 
what we want to be. Sittlichkeit thus constitutes an ethical narrative. 
The identification of citizens with democracy as a common enterprise is 
essentially the recognition of a common good. Since we exercise freedom in common 
actions, it seems that we value it as a common good.  A liberal democracy may only be 
successful if capable of relying on a sense of loyalty and identification with pluralism and 
participation. A democracy that sees in the participatory self-rule an essential component 
of it recognizes that rule as a basic notion of good life.  
How do freedom, benevolence, equality, justice, and mutual respect became 
moral imperatives throughout modernity? The question for the moral sources of 
modernity remains. What are the constitutive goods that underlie those values? Is it the 
attempt of modern morality to reconstruct ethics without any reference to the Good 
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something possible? Because we articulate the goods through narrative and language we 
can understand them as moral sources. Taylor argues that the articulation of the goods 
that define who we are is critical in order to offer moral and political reasons: 
 
“The belief in God, say, offers a reason […] as an 
articulation of what is crucial to the shape of the moral world in 
one’s best account. It offers a reason rather as I do when I lay out 
my most basic concerns in order to make sense of my life to you. 
And we can see right off from this why the perception of a 
hypergood, while offering a reason, at the same time helps define 
my identity”56. 
 
Taylor speaks about the role that “qualitative discriminations” play in ethical life. 
They offer some sense regarding what is worth fostering of human agency. Our moral 
discernments go beyond disengaged and instrumental reason because they are always 
placed within certain frameworks that give some context to them. These are the horizons 
of meaning within which we develop our life and that provide significant orientation for 
the definitions of our identities.  In the West an important portion of frameworks belong 
to the set of values that have their origin in the Gospel’s concern for life.  
Utilitarianism and deontologism do not leave too much room for qualitative 
distinctions. Why a person is worthy of respect seems not to be a question able to be 
addressed procedurally. Whereas for Kant a moral agent loses her moral autonomy when 
she incorporates qualitative distinctions, Taylor sees more goods involved in a moral 
decision.  
Obviously, a moral theory of goods has to face several challenges. In fact, the 
problem with the goods is that they tend to be particular and tend to be articulated in a 
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particular way by particular communities or cultures. Goods are always embedded in the 
concrete way of life of a concrete community. That is why morality tends to develop a 
universal ethic capable of offering principles that determine what kind of actions belong 
to the universal definition of the human subject.  The stress on a procedural view of 
ethics is clearly bound up with its allegiance to the modern notion of individual freedom. 
We all show some allegiance to some goods over others. How to promote reconciliation 
and articulation of different kind of goods in a same community? 
Modernity for Taylor is still committed to the protection of some “hypergoods” 
that are an essential part of the definition of the identity of the modern subject. Modernity 
is more a narrative than the result of instrumental reason; a narrative that linked the self 
with the protection of the goods that define the modern identity. These hypergoods are 
ultimately the three main moral sources of modernity for Taylor: the theistic ground; 
naturalism of disengaged reason, and romantic expressivism.57  
The conception of irreducibly social goods is bound up not only with some 
important aspects of modern politics, but also provides a significant ground for the role 
that religions might play in the polity. Considering some goods as irreducible and held in 
common might help modern societies to recover some significant symbolic, ritual, 
sacramental attributes of our lives that have been treated as private aspects. These are 
collective goods that shape the way we understand and value human agency. The modern 
and utilitarian idea that all goods are for the individual prevents us from understanding 
significant features of modern ethical life.  
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5. Modern Goods, Christian Goods  
 
 I will argue in this section that modern values such as liberty, equality, and 
mutual respect are not at all foreign to Christian faith. On the contrary, I will claim, 
following Taylor, that those principles are, ultimately, founded on the Gospel ethics. 
Some of the most important modern achievements seem to be a secularization of 
Christian moral standards.  
An important concept in the philosophy of Taylor resides in what he calls the 
“affirmation of ordinary life.”58 It is central to his reading of what constitutes the modern 
identity and can be defined as a transvaluation of values, as a subversion of the 
aristocratic ethic of honor so central to pre-modern times.  
Ordinary life designates “those aspects of human life concerned with production 
and reproduction, that is, labor, the making of the things needed for life, and our life of 
sexual beings, including marriage and the family.”59 It is opposed to the pre-modern 
ethics that exalted contemplation and participation instead of manual labor as higher 
human activities. It is also opposed to the ethic of honor and glory based on the values of 
war. The good life is no longer to be found in higher activities –contemplation, religious 
asceticism or the citizen rule– but it is to be found at the very heart of daily life. Human 
beings are seen as producers who find his dignity not in honor but in labor. This trend 
was born against higher goods that served as a cover to justify the privileged status of a 
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higher, aristocratic, and noble ruler, religious, or military class. The bourgeois ethic of 
ordinary life opposed itself to the ethic of honor and fame.  
The transition from an ethics that held a strong sense of hierarchy to another 
ethics that praise labor, production, and family life, displaces the locus of the good life 
from higher activities placing it within life itself. Everyone can now participate at the 
center of the good life. The ethic of glory is confronted with an alternative view: the 
bourgeois ethics so central to the development of modern liberal society, the value of 
equality and the defense of universal rights.  
Hence the radical unconditionality of human rights became one of the main 
driving forces of modern liberal culture. Taylor sees a theological origin in the 
affirmation of ordinary life and its defense of equality, liberty and the respect of human 
rights. It was necessary to break with Christendom in order to achieve the idea of equality 
and the ethics of human rights. Within Christendom we could never have attained this 
radical unconditionality of the value of human life. Although the impossibility of that 
unconditionality does not lie on Christian faith but in the project of Christendom: the 
attempt to marry faith with a form of culture and a mode of society. Today, we know 
there never can be a total fusion of faith and society because human society in history 
inevitably involves coercion and coercion, as Weber argued, is to be monopolized by the 
State and, of course, is not part of the role of religions. Since no other single doctrine has 
taken the place of Christendom, the public realm has remained the locus of rival 
fundamental worldviews.  
The affirmation of ordinary life has a Judeo-Christian origin and was brought 
back to the center of the culture first by the work of the Reformation. The Reformation 
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did not distinguish between more or less committed Christians. Lutheran principles of 
sola fides, sola scriptura, and sola gratia might be seen as a powerful engine of 
democratization of faith. They placed the salvation of a hopeless humankind on the pure 
action of a merciful gracious God.60 The sacraments, the hierarchy of the Church, the role 
of the priest and his celibacy, and monastic life are seen by Luther as mediations between 
God and the people that ought to be rejected. Laypeople should no longer depend on the 
prayers of the consecrated. The new theological insight of sola fides not only reflected a 
theological principle but also a new sense of the relevancy of the personal commitment. 
By rejecting any form of consecrated life (higher vocations as Taylor calls them in A 
Secular Age) as a privileged place of the sacred, Protestantism somehow denied the 
distinction between the sacred and the profane. What is important in light of the 
extension of the gospel values is that the fullness of the Christian experience is now to be 
found within the activities of ordinary life: marriage, family and work. Modernity was 
born as an anti-hierarchical movement that ended up widening the notion of agape. This 
notion of the affirmation of ordinary life is, ultimately, grounded on the Bible: God 
herself supports life. 
Paradoxically, some of the most impressive extensions of gospel ethics, such as 
universal solidarity and the affirmation of the value of ordinary life, depended on a 
breakaway from Christendom. That breakaway allowed a significant portion of our 
religious background to become part of the content of our modern horizons of meaning. 
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The “Good Samaritan Parable” constitutes a fine example of how a religious good has 
become part of our common sense of solidarity in the West. We might even find in the 
Rawlsian “difference principle” some echo of that story. That is why modernity is not 
entirely alien to Christianity, because it shows a Christian inheritance in its convictions 
regarding universal rights. The modern approach to human potential seems to be 
ultimately grounded on a Judeo-Christian foundation. The modern commitment to 
improve living and working conditions, overcoming poverty, and increasing progress and 
human welfare might be seen as a rationalization of Christian agape. The philosophy of 
the Enlightenment defines itself over and against a traditional and religious past; it 
wished to reject some aspects of history that it found harmful for humanity. But to what 
extent does modern thought still live from the moral and spiritual insights that has 
supposedly rejected? 
Many of the moral sources of the West have been expressed through stories that 
have had powerful consequences. The story of the Exodus has inspired many other stories 
of liberation in history, such as the civil rights movement in the U.S. This example shows 
how the articulation of goods has been always historical.  
This whole relationship between secular reason and Christianity throughout 
modernity is carefully reviewed by Taylor. I agree when he understands the movement to 
secular modern reason as a paradigm shift. Modernity is somehow grounded on a moral 
shift from a theological view of life to secular reason that has tried to prove some 
superiority of the latter tradition of moral thought over the former. It is reason 
overcoming faith and science overcoming the symbolic and the sacred. Taylor calls this 
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process with the name of “suppression arguments.”61 As Kant pointed out, becoming 
enlightened is like growing up: “sapere aude.” Enlightenment is seen as a new moral 
standing that brings light to beliefs, traditions and different frameworks of representation 
that have darken the mind of the autonomous agent. A shift from substantive to 
instrumental reason makes modernity hostile to mystery and religion and the notion of 
good life disappears under a disengaged objectification. Modernity leaves behind the 
“porous self” and adopts instead the “buffered self”62.  
However, part of the misunderstandings between the Catholic Church and secular 
liberalism are not only the result of a new hostile paradigm but also the result of some 
inner Catholic practices and views. Michael Buckley63, aiming to track the emergence of 
atheism in modernity, argues that Catholicism in order to defend God’s existence 
abandoned the notion of the personal God for a natural-theistic idea of God. In some 
sense scientific theology has historically neglected a more categorical and experiential 
approach to God. To leave aside the revelatory dimension of the God of Jesus Christ in 
order to defend his existence would end in an internal contradiction that leads to unbelief.  
That is what happened, Buckley continues, when Descartes assigned to the rational 
method of his philosophy the task of demonstrating God’s existence. An internal 
contradiction arises when we see religion as something that ought to be demonstrated. It 
helps to create what Taylor calls “impersonal order” where the personal relationship with 
the God of the Bible fades.  
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Society becomes an order of mutual benefit where human agency is governed by 
reason. Religion develops into a morality and Christianity turns out to be a form of 
humanism. Here God is neither the personal God of an intersubjective relation, nor the 
God of Abraham, but rather a sort of administrator of an impersonal natural order. In the 
moral world of mutual benefit ruled by an impersonal God known by the means of 
reason, exclusive humanism flourishes and benevolence ends up being the entire human 
vocation. Taylor calls this historical process the “eclipse of grace”: by reason, autonomy, 
and discipline human beings are able to govern their lives and the world. It is in this 
context that modern defenders of God’s existence espoused an apologetic stand that 
transformed faith into a Deist perspective and God into an impersonal ruler of the 
universe, thereby abandoning the religious experience of God’s revelation in Jesus Christ. 
Power, reason and invulnerability, a sense of achievement, education, discipline, and 
civility are the features that characterize the new modern identity.  
Taylor will argue in A Secular Age that it is precisely this perception of 
accomplishment that brings, at the same time, flatness, emptiness and a lack of felt 
meaning to a growing category of people who, unable to accept orthodox Christianity, 
seek for some alternative spiritual sources. This is one of the dissatisfactions that Taylor 
treats under the name of “the malaises of modernity”.64 
These misunderstandings between the Catholic Church and modernity are also 
related to the way we understand the word katholou (Catholic).65  The Scriptures promise 
a kind of reconciliation based on “oneness”, in the sense that human beings cannot attain 
wholeness individually, because complementarity –and not uniformity or radical 
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identity– is essential. Every time the Catholic Church fosters uniformity instead of 
complementarity loses faithfulness to Catholicism, because it privileges unity but at the 
price of suppressing some of the diversity created by God.  An approach to the universal 
claims of Christianity as “unity-across-difference” instead of “unity-through-sameness”66 
might prove to be helpful for the relationship between religious reasons and political 
arguments in the public conversation.  
This approach becomes significant when we hold that some of the most important 
modern goods are, ultimately gospel goods.  We find through modernity some authentic 
developments of the gospel, such as universal rights and the value of equality. Yet we 
also find a negation of God that ends up marginalizing the gospels. We witness an 
interesting dilemma here: even though we cannot dismiss the Christian roots of the West, 
secular reason, liberalism, and exclusive humanism in some sense make Christian faith a 
foreigner in its own culture. Across his corpus Taylor defends the thesis that the 
affirmation of universal rights are part of the biblical story that has fostered the respect 
for life. To say that universal rights are radically unconditional –namely, that they do not 
depend on gender, culture, religion, and so on– corresponds with the Christian notion of 
Imago Dei: human beings have been created in the image and likeness of God and 
everyone has the same value before God. Yet this became possible only after the 
medieval hierarchical society collapsed. How can we distinguish the universal claims of 
Christianity from the attempt to marry the faith with a particular culture, a mode of 
society, and a form of government? 
Rather than an epistemological or even metaphysical turn, Taylor sees modernity 
and its relation to the sacred and the supernatural as a move towards a different “horizon 
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of assumptions” or “climate of thought”; a new moral force rather than a doctrine. A 
certain climate makes western cultures inhospitable to religion and to the transcendent. 
Obstacles to belief come along with new social imaginaries, that is to say, new ways of 
understanding ourselves in a given period of time. The incompatibility seems to be at the 
moral and spiritual level. That is why a richer and fuller approach to ethical life that sees 
morality not as an instrument or procedure, but as a way of being, is so critical when we 
think about the role of communities of faith in democratic societies.  
The immanent and the transcendent are two different and often competing views 
of human life. For believers the human person bears an irreducible inclination to 
something beyond biological life. The disengaged and instrumental mode of life –that has 
been at the core of many of the most influential moral theories– ends up being quite 
inhospitable to belief and to the contribution of communities of faith. The instrumental, 
atomistic society –as the sum of bearers of individual rights– leaves its citizens without a 
sense of common purpose and meaning in life. It is the idea of disenchantment that 
Taylor borrows from Weber and that is so central to Sources of the Self and to A Secular 
Age.  How can we reconcile respect for liberty without fostering an atomistic focus on 
individual goals –all the while keeping alive the sense of a community found on common 
ends? Here it lays the crux of the dilemma for the role of religion –as well as any more 
symbolic, aesthetic, and ethical views of life– in modern democratic societies. The search 
is for ways to recover a language of commitment to a greater whole and to a greater 
meaning, something beyond individual fulfillment. Social fragmentation leaves the public 
domain empty of a meaning capable of creating allegiance and a common commitment 
among individuals. Here religion might play a significant role.  
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6. Religious Arguments and Civil Society 
 
 Introducing an adequate distinction between the government (and the State) and 
the meaning of the public sphere is crucial to the discussion of the relationship between 
the Catholic Church and liberal democracy.  I will argue in this final section that the 
place where religious arguments should be developed is the civil society.  This assertion 
synthesizes something that I have been arguing throughout the thesis.  That (1) 
secularization with regard to the strict separation between Church and State has turned 
out to be something positive for both institutions; and (2) that the relationship between 
religion and politics is something not only hard to divide and distinguish, but also 
something that represents a healthy and helpful relationship for society and human life. 
The civil society, as the public sphere, constitutes a crucial locus for the development of 
the moral and spiritual identity of both the individual agent and the community.  
 A fundamental distinction between State and society is made by Charles Taylor in 
an article named “Invoking Civil Society”67. Even though he does not enter this 
discussion specifically in light of the role of religion in modern democracies, some of his 
insights will be recollected here. Taylor explores the meaning of civil society as a 
multifaceted and complex reality, and as a web of associations that, being independent 
from the State, are influential in the elaboration of public policies.   
 Almost fifty years prior to this article John Courtney Murray and Jacques 
Maritain explored the distinction between State and society in order to show that 
religious claims can be compatible with the principles of a liberal democracy not at the 
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level of the government but at the level of the civil society68.  They understood civil 
society as a rich number of different communities that play a public role even though 
they are not the State: trade unions, faith communities, universities, newspapers and 
magazines, books and journals, professional associations, and electronic media.  
 Societies may be divided in four different spheres of meanings. These are (1) 
political society: the State and the government, the elaboration and execution of the law, 
public policies, and the monopoly of violence; (2) civil society: associations in general, 
the place where people develop networks and social capital, power to persuade and the 
place for shared values and common goals; (3) economic society: business, money, and 
entrepreneurship; (4) the private life of the family.  
 Civil society is the locus where we place agency as our ability to invoke reasons 
and arguments to support the moral views that define our identity. The civil society is not 
the State or the government, but is still a political and public domain.  It is political in the 
sense that society is the place where individuals and collectives encounter each other, 
demanding recognition of their identities and championing particular values and 
worldviews. It is the place where different horizons of meaning permeate each other. It is 
the home of what Ronald Thiemann calls the “pilgrim self”69 –a person in progress, 
forged by the encounter of different communities and traditions and yet able to keep her 
liberty.  
 In civil society, the people’s convictions overlap within the multiplicity of 
solidarities in which they participate. This is the place in which the identity of the subject 
becomes multiple: shaped by her belonging to different cultural worlds: State, nation, 
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family, class, religion, gender, culture, society, and the like. Here is where communities 
of faith play their particular role invoking their convictions and reasons in the midst of 
what looks like an irreducible heterogeneity.  
 The notion of civil society demonstrates that the compartmentalization of the 
ethical and the political –a strict division between the private and the public– is hard to 
sustain: all forms of politics require a self that is the result of the encounter of different 
identities at the public level. This distinction also brings to the fore another division that I 
have been trying to problematize throughout this work: it is one thing is to separate the 
Church from the State, but another quite different thing is to divide religion and politics.  
 The domain of the public –understood more broadly than government– designates 
what is of common concern, what matters to the entire society. The sense of nation 
emerges not only from the government but also from newspapers, universities, books, 
and even from bars. Part of what civil society is comes from public opinion, which, 
according to Taylor, is not only the sum of individual opinions but the product of 
longstanding elaboration. What makes it public in its strongest sense is that it has been 
recognized by everyone as something held in common, but elaborated outside the State. 
Society is not identical with its political organization. This feature of liberalism might be 
helpful for the role of religions in public life. The civil society is, ultimately, the locus for 
radical political and religious hopes.  
 The public sphere is a crucial characteristic of modern society. It is the domain 
where people not only freely form their opinions and convictions, both individually and 
collectively, but also where those opinions seek to influence somehow the future of the 
society. The public realm forms a common space that leads to the creation of public 
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opinion. Discussion takes place in the public arena, through different kinds of media, and 
tends toward a common resolution or at least toward a mutual understanding between the 
participants. This shared discussion involves the whole society. “A general understanding 
of what things count as is constitutive of the reality we call the public sphere.”70 The 
public sphere is an open place for a discussion that potentially involves everyone so the 
society can come to a common mind about significant matters. To reach a common 
understanding does not mean to reach moral or political consensus, but it means to 
engage in a critical debate about affairs that involve some common aspects of common 
life. Participating in civil society helps people to see themselves as belonging to a 
community that shares some collective purposes. An adequate understanding of the 
purpose of the civil society might bring new forms of political imagination open to bridge 
the gap between contemporary liberal democracy and collective, religious, and communal 
categories that can be employed in the public discourse. At the level of the public sphere 
people should have the right to use the categories that best define their identity and 
express their sense of belonging.  
 Obviously, the outcome of the public discussion does not have any legal or 
compulsory value, but the government rules sovereign and reasoning people.  So before a 
law comes out from the parliament it somehow retrieves what has already been emerging 
out of the debate among citizens.  The public discussion in the public sphere is not an 
exercise of power but it ends up influencing those in power.   In some sense, civil society 
might be seen as a remedy for the political fragmentation that emerges from a society 
understood as an aggregation of individuals who deny any political and communal 
vocation. Democratic deliberation is something like the public sphere, or the public 
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sphere is at least involved in the democratic process of decision-making. Participating in 
the public square bound citizens together in light of common projects and allegiances. 
Once people are able to identify themselves with a set of goods and ends, political 
fragmentation is reversed. 
 It is crucial for the Church to be aware that society can also function as a whole 
outside the political (State/government) realm, that society is not constituted by the 
government, but limits it. Understanding this extra-political meaning (in the sense of not 
being part of political power) of society is central for the contribution of the church to the 
polity, because this is the locus where communities of faith can exercise their religious 
and moral vocation publicly and where Christianity may display its theological-political 
ethos. 
 It becomes a challenge for religions that hold a public/political nature to be sure 
that the State leaves enough room for the development of the civil society. A flourishing 
civil society is central to democracy because it allows different communities to be part of 
the common deliberation. The Catholic Church must defend, protect, and foster an open 
and healthy debate on issues that are central to her concerns. The place to do that is the 
civil society. The more space for civil society the more options for a persuasive role of 
faith in defending certain values. The attempt to merge faith (or any other kind of 
ultimate vision) with a form of government has taken religions to an extreme 
marginalization. That is the case of the Catholic Church behind the iron curtain and that 
is what happens if we do not unveil secular liberalism as a kind of ideology. The more 
independent the Church is from political authority, the freer she is to express her own 
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commitments.  The existence of the public sphere shows that these debates, the 
differences, and the conflicts are perfectly legitimate in a plural world.  
 Even though the Church runs the risk of becoming irrelevant in some liberal 
societies where pluralism and mutual respect are seen to push any ontological and moral 
claim to the private sphere, liberal societies can be also the best place for public religions. 
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III.  Hope: the political dimension of Christian Faith 
 
 Throughout the second chapter I have attempted to prove that religion, and in 
particular Christianity, plays a legitimate public/political role in society: specifically, it 
both strengthens political identity and shapes some notion of shared goods and goals 
within a liberal democracy.  We have seen how a richer understanding of ethics can bring 
back to the polity a fuller understanding of human agency. We have also seen how some 
of the most significant aspects and values of western modern societies have ultimately 
been formed by its Christian background. I aimed to show that Christianity could be 
compatible with liberty and tolerance, because freedom and mutual respect are values 
ultimately grounded on the Gospel. 
 A religious solution to the problem of religious diversity in a democratic society 
requires a very high form of religious commitment. The Catholic Church can seek to 
proclaim her loftiest insights while yet preserving a humble recognition of the fact that all 
concrete expressions of religious faith have been subject to some historical contingency.  
 The idea that some day human life will improve and justice will arrive has 
constituted a driving force throughout history. This yearning has been particularly strong 
in modernity. Two ideologies sum up this modern utopic trend. First, great confidence 
was placed in the notion of a progress grounded in the power of human reason and in the 
liberty of the bourgeoisie. This first utopia expected that the scientific revolution would 
bring growth and improvement to the world by replacing the old religious and 
metaphysical cosmogony. The power of reason would then bring humanity to a higher 
stage in the scale of development. A second approach also attempted to improve the 
 79 
human condition, but understood progress as the liberation of the industrial proletariat 
through a revolution powered by the class struggle. Modern ideals have pushed humanity 
to yearn for a better future and to put all the trust in purely human potential. We know 
today that, even though human life has improved in several aspects, neither the notion of 
an unbounded scientific progress nor the attempt to emancipate the proletariat brought 
total happiness to the world.  On the contrary, both ideologies have brought some 
progress but also a fair amount of disgrace.  
 There is a sort of inescapable vocation of religion, and particularly Christianity, to 
announce that history is directed to its consummation; that the whole of creation will be 
reconciled at the end time; that the search of justice will be fulfilled ultimately by God; 
that the human being has an indelible, transcendent vocation; that our efforts toward 
justice and the common good will be the very goods that God will use to re-create the 
world at the end of days.  
 For these reasons, Christians probably offer their best contribution to modern life 
in announcing hope. Moreover, an eschatological understanding of human agency may 
also offset some of the potential tensions implicit in ultimate/comprehensive visions of 
life.  
 In this final chapter I will advocate the need of an eschatological framing of 
human agency. I do so precisely to avoid the conflictive dimension of religious 
convictions. I will claim that the irreducibly political character of Christian faith finds its 
best expression in the theological virtue of hope. I will also claim that, as history has 
shown, immanent progress will never be capable of redeeming human beings. I aim to 
show not only that the search for hope is an anthropological constant, but also that the 
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Church must play an “interruptive71” role: eschatological hope affects our capacity for 
political and ethical determination in social and personal conditions of suffering and 
injustice. As Johann Baptist Metz points out, the political role of Christianity lies in the 
eschatological meaning of hope: it is the question of salvation for those who suffer, for 
the victims of history. We will see that the political character of hope is to be found not in 
a particular historical notion that fills hope with some concrete content, but in an 
apocalyptic eschatology.  
 As a transition from the last chapter, we will devote the first section to exploring 
those aspects of Taylor’s thought where he expresses the need to recover an 
eschatological perspective on human life. Taylor sees the projection of life beyond 
history as an anthropological constant that has been suffocated by some aspects of the 
modern vision of life. A brief presentation of this “malaise” of modernity will stress the 
need for the missionary task of the Church in announcing eschatological hope. In the 
second section I will introduce a distinction between human progress and divine 
redemption and briefly describe Christian hope as the opportunity to publicly speak about 
God. The third section is central to this final chapter. There we will look at the 
political/public consequences of an apocalyptic hope. Drawing especially in the theology 
of Metz and Moltmann I will emphasize that eschatological hope requires us to bring 
back the idea of an immanent expectation: here hope unveils its political nature. Because 
time is bounded, we can still remain hopeful and the Church can negotiate the tension 
between the divine promises and the iniquities of the world. 
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1. Beyond human flourishing 
 
 Charles Taylor concludes Sources of the Self by putting his own cards on the 
table. A secular perspective of life removes “any religious dimension or radical hope in 
history”72 and ends up “stifling the response in us to some of the deepest and most 
powerful spiritual aspirations that humans have conceived”73.  The whole project of 
Sources of the Self has been, in Taylor’s words, a work of liberation. He has tried to show 
those blind spots on modern history that tend, in our culture, to “stifle the spirit”. That is 
why Taylor’s work is an effort to retrieve all those human goods that have been buried 
under modern instrumental rationality.  Taylor takes the risk of defending the 
significance of these goods, even though they have been accused of bringing mutilation 
and destruction to history. He places his hope in history, and, fundamentally, in the story 
of the God of Abraham who has left his “promise of a divine affirmation of the human, 
more total than humans can ever attain unaided”.74  
 Toward the last four chapters of A Secular Age the same philosophy/theology of 
hope comes to the fore again. Here Taylor aims to show how uncomfortable human 
beings feel under the instrumental/immanent paradigm. This uneasiness is part of the 
malaises of modernity that create an explosion of new forms of belief that makes the late 
modern spiritual and moral landscape quite fragmented and fragile. The 19th century 
Romantic-expressivist turn becomes a mass phenomenon during the 1960’s in the sexual 
revolution. Against the hegemony of calculating reason and against the higher demands 
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of Christian ascetism we find the aspiration to rescue the body and rehabilitate human 
desire. “Excarnation”75 becomes and important concept in these chapters, in which 
Taylor offers his own view of the current spiritual culture. He claims that even though a 
movement towards different forms of “excarnation” has been part of the paths that 
Christianity has chosen throughout history, Christian faith essentially involves the hope 
of an ultimate reconciliation of humans and God in the resurrected body. There is here an 
interesting connection between a contemporary spiritual retrieving of the body and the 
centrality of incarnation in Christian theology. The aspiration to wholeness entails the 
restoration of a healthy relation to the body. Ordinary life and sexuality must be 
incorporated in the human quest for plenitude.  
 Recovering the importance of eschatological hope does not imply forgetting and 
marginalizing the value of ordinary life. As I argued in the second chapter, modernity and 
Christianity agree in the appreciation of ordinary life: work, love, family, experiences, 
and relationships. Taylor does not hesitate in drawing on Christian theology to defend the 
compatibility between the value of ordinary life and eschatological hope.  
 Throughout the last two chapters of A Secular Age, “Unquiet Frontiers of 
Modernity” and “Conversions” Taylor aims to prove how the quest for hope is as alive as 
ever. The different (late) modern conceptions of time, the importance of art, the place of 
death, and the search for meaning become ways to go beyond the “immanent frame”:76 
far from being comfortably settled in unbelief, the secular age seems schizophrenic.  
 Taylor examines “conversions” in order to show that “understanding our time in 
Christian terms is partly to discern these new paths, opened by pioneers who have 
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discovered a way through the particular labyrinthine landscape we live in, to God”77. 
Here Taylor looks at some of those who broke the “immanent frame”, both believers and 
unbelievers who went through some kind of conversion, who went through a kind of 
epiphanic experience. Again the lived experience, the social imaginaries, turns out to be 
critical in this kind of narrative. The book gets into the itineraries of faith of a long list of 
poets and writers. What is common in the experience of all of them is that they all believe 
in the value of democracy, liberty, equality, and human rights. None of them is alienated 
from the modern age; rather they exercise their critique from within modernity. These are 
figures that have placed the sacred and the spiritual in organic relation to their individual 
and social lives.  
 The search for authenticity might be the ground for a revival of hope as human 
flourishing beyond history. A dialectical approach to authenticity shows the positive side 
of individual quests as the waiting rooms for the rediscovery and revitalization of 
Christian faith. A Catholic Church aware of these movements can play a significant role 
emphasizing the radical significance that communal belonging has for human life. 
Human aspiration for religion persists amid all these forms of secularization and in the 
desire for a personal relationship to God at the spiritual level. 
 Some of the more spiritual and theological conclusions reached by Taylor about 
the rehabilitation of the body, a personal God, the difficulties of the contemporary subject 
with authority and belonging, etc. are not novel for someone already involved in 
contemporary theology. In some sense, the biblical, patristic, liturgical, and cultural 
aggiornamento of the Church during Vatican II demonstrate that these concerns have 
been present in the Church for decades. At any rate, what is important for the purposes of 
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this thesis is that the contemporary expressivist spirituality, which shows a novel thirst 
for meaning and fullness, offers a new fertile terrain for the proclamation of the gospel. It 
shows that the need for hope remains necessary even today.  
 
2. Hope and Redemption 
 
 In this section I will briefly introduce the necessity of being aware of the 
difference between the historical possibilities of human progress and the eschatological 
promise delivered by God through the resurrection of Jesus Christ. Even though I will 
defend further the continuity between historical liberation and eschatological fulfillment, 
I will argue here that only an eschatological concept of hope can satisfy the human 
longing for justice and transcendence. Moreover, hope constitutes an opportunity to 
publicly speak of God. 
 A clear distinction between human progress and divine redemption is crucial in 
the encyclical letter on Christian Hope: Spe Salvi.78 Benedict identifies political hope 
with (1) the modern attempt to bring happiness and welfare to society, driven by the 
power of reason and the freedom of the autonomous individual; (2) with the bourgeois 
revolution;  (3) and with the Marxist revolution that wished to bring about a definitive 
change in history. The outcome of human progress has turned out to be quite ambiguous: 
it has produced, simultaneously, the cure of mortal diseases and the atomic bomb. In 
responding to the question about what kind of progress makes life more human, the 
Church might play a significant role. The moral and spiritual wellbeing of human beings 
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will never be completely guaranteed by material progress. Human beings will never be 
redeemed by improvements external to them. The letter is clear in arguing that it is 
neither science nor reason that, ultimately, redeems human beings: they are redeemed by 
love.79 Hope is essentially faith in an absolute and unconditional love capable of 
redeeming human beings.  
 Spe Salvi emphasizes the communitarian aspect of Christian hope. Hope in 
isolation will never be real hope because there is no salvation in isolation. Hope is always 
something collective, communal, and social. Redemption is the re-establishment of unity. 
Benedict XVI stresses the social character of hope as a community-oriented virtue.  
 Christian hope helps us to discern the answer to the question: when is the world 
better? What will make the world definitely good? The Church ought to offer her own 
response to these questions in the public conversation. The Church has to remind society 
that human progress will never be capable of redeeming human beings.  The hope we 
hold is not only for us but essentially for others. Only when someone hopes for others 
does she hopes for herself too. That is why prayer, advocacy, charity, and solidarity are 
so important.  
 Hope might also stand against some features of the so-called return of religion. 
Because of the communitarian, political, and redemptive character of hope, this virtue 
rejects a new-age spirituality that leads to a vague, diffuse, and individualistic religiosity, 
one that seeks the divine not in God but within human beings. The Christian notion of 
hope, by contrast, is rooted in the concrete story of the God of Abraham and of Jesus 
Christ. In Jesus Christ, God enters human history. Jesus takes up the prophetic message 
of God and the coming of the kingdom of God as a kingdom of justice, peace, and 
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freedom. In Jesus, God goes to the cross and there, through his death, institutes a new 
beginning and a hope for a new life.   
 On the cross, God does not eliminate suffering but redeems it. The theology of the 
cross comes across as a word of hope for the world, in the living God who gives life. 
Hope does not only entail personal fulfillment and happiness, but also welfare for the 
whole world in justice and peace.  
 To talk about the irreducible political nature of Christian faith implies claiming in 
the public the relevance of speaking about God. By doing this, theology does not derive a 
concrete political program from God’s message, but it seeks to place religion in relation 
to politics as a form to promote freedom, justice, and solidarity. All of these are values 
deeply embedded on the gospels. 
 Christian theology will retain its public relevance if it is capable of keeping its 
own identity: namely, if it keeps speaking of God in a distinctive and, at the same time, in 
an engaging manner. The Church can thus open new perspectives of hope for the 
contemporary humanity.  
 
3. The Political Consequences of Eschatological Hope 
 
 In the first chapter I introduced some aspects of the theologies of Johann Baptist 
Metz and Jürgen Moltmann in order to stress the public/political nature of Christian faith. 
In this final section we will return to both theologians to argue that the public role of 
theology relies, chiefly, on an apocalyptic concept of hope. We will see in this section 
that eschatological hope has both a political/public nature and political/historical 
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consequences.  I will place this reflection in dialogue with Joseph Ratzinger’s 
Eschatology and a few aspects of Jon Sobrino’s theology.    
  
a. An Apocalyptic Notion of Hope 
 Metz’s theology turns from the Incarnation, as the proper framework in which to 
understand the Christian attitude towards the world80 to eschatology. In Faith in History 
and Society theology became for Metz very much what is counseled by the First Letter of 
Peter, namely to give a justification for the hope that it is in us (3:15).  Eschatology 
becomes the starting point for theology because it reinforces the shift to praxis and to the 
political. The revisionist Marxist Philosopher Ernst Bloch, in his immense Principle of 
Hope,81 was quite influential in restoring this turn to hope and the future as the vital 
horizon for Christian faith. For Bloch, history is shaped by the coming into being of what 
has not yet existed. Human agency is oriented to bring into existence what is so far only 
future. This power of utopia pushes history forward.  
 Metz aimed to build up a theology able to remain significant for the world. In this 
regard, theology was obliged to reflect upon suffering and injustice in order to bring hope 
for the victims of history. Theology had to be defined and contextualized by its socio-
political situation.  Hence, the point of departure for a theology committed to human life 
should be the eschatological message of Jesus Christ.  
 It is the notion of hope that makes theology political. Hope, understood as the 
fulfillment of human longings, stands against the modern trend to a radical privatization 
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of faith. Metz produces his political theology as a way to renegotiate the Catholic 
Church’s attitude towards modernity. As we will see, Metz stresses an apocalyptic 
concept of hope, because it resists the modern understanding of time and history. 
Apocalyptic texts bring interruption into proximity.  
 A theology like this, which aims for political impact, grounds its insights on the 
Bible. The stories of the Old Testament are stories of human beings becoming subjects 
before God, becoming subjects of a new history driven by God’s promises. Ever since the 
story of Abraham, faith has been oriented by eschatological promises. The contrast 
between these promises and historical reality constitutes a Christian criterion to discern 
and evaluate social and political life. Christians can inquire to what extent society is 
leading human beings to the fulfillment of those promises. Here lies, for political 
theology, the social-critical task of faith, particularly in relation to the life of the poor and 
the victims of history. When bringing hope to society, the Church contradicts the 
experience of the present by the hope in the future: namely, the hope in the resurrection 
of all those who are living under the sign of the cross.  
 It is in the eschatological horizon of hope that society emerges as a history 
directed to its consummation. In this sense, it seems to be crucial to be able to articulate a 
theology related to history and society. The free action of human beings plays a 
significant role, since it is oriented toward shaping the world. Hope, in its turn, gives a 
horizon of meaning to human freedom.82  
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 Eschatology introduces a crucial contribution of the discussion for the place and 
the role of religion and Christianity in public life— especially when the public sphere 
remains the locus where ultimate visions compete. The emphasis on eschatology as the 
starting point for theology means that God and not some other historical principle, is the 
unique subject that governs history. The Christian notion of hope prevents Christianity 
from becoming potentially conflictual because the reconciliation of all things in Jesus 
Christ will occur at the end of times. An eschatological fulfillment of human hope will 
prevent a class, a people, scientific progress, religious institutions, or even intra-historical 
utopias from becoming the exhaustive –and therefore both partial and totalitarian– goal of 
history.  Metz calls this prevention the “eschatological proviso.”83 There is a gap between 
the eschatological message of Jesus and political reality. Even though the eschatological 
promises have a political/public nature (liberty, peace, justice, reconciliation, and a new 
earth) and animate Christians to bring them to society, the content of these promises 
cannot be identified with a historical goal, a kind of society, or a particular political 
tendency. In Metz word, the eschatological proviso “makes every historically real status 
of society appear to be provisional.”84 
 The eschatological expectation is political not in the sense that it assumes a 
particular political content, but in the sense that it functions as a historical/liberating 
driving force. Hope, leading history towards its reconciliation, drives human solidarity 
within the world and towards the future. The biblical promises question human life and 
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encourage us to make them a reality in the present society, especially for the poor. The 
biblical promises invite believers to stand critically before the world.  
 That is why Ratzinger’s critique to political theology seems to be relevant.85  
From the perspective of an Agustinian theology, Joseph Ratzinger introduces some 
objections to political theology. He thinks that the realization of the kingdom of God will 
never be a political process. If we see Christianity as a strategy to bring hope, then the 
question is: “Which hope”?  God’s kingdom does not have a political content: it would 
become a “false messianic movement” that will lead to totalitarianism. Likewise the 
world will be transformed by God’s grace and not by political actions. For Ratzinger 
political life belongs to the realm of moral theology and not to eschatology. The kingdom 
of God is a moral norm of political activity.86 Theology has to keep away from politics in 
order to avoid Christian totalitarianism. Ratzinger seems to advocate no less than the 
liberal church/state separation principle: Christian faith cannot marry a particular political 
system.  
 Most likely, both Metz and Moltmann would agree with this statement.  Christian 
faith cannot become a political system. Yet they see a political ethos in theology in the 
liberating consequences of the hope in the risen Lord. More precisely, the difference 
between Metz and Ratzinger is to be found in the fact that for Metz a proper approach to 
eschatology ought to be apocalyptic. Metz does not seem to defend a particular historical 
                                                      
85
 Joseph Ratzinger, Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life, trans. Michael Waldstein (Washington, D.C., 
The Catholic University Press, 1988), 57-60 
86
 According to Metz, because theology is political systematic theology itself should deal with modernity, 
society, and politics. Metz sees in the social teaching of the Church an appendix: in order to leave theology 
untouched by the world the Church builds the social teaching to deal with political and social problems. 
The Church shields theology from social affairs. Metz introduces a harsh critique when saying that the 
Church uses the Social Teaching to relief the social and political pressures exerted by the world to 
systematic theology.  
 91 
content for the notion of hope: rather he defends its apocalyptic character. Herein lies its 
political nature.  
 Hope is apocalyptic because it implies some imminent expectation.87 Eschatology 
has an apocalyptic character when time becomes crucial. When the expectation is 
imminent then discipleship becomes something urgent. When the expectation is no longer 
imminent and when theology loses this sense of time, then the Christian God loses social 
and historical relevance. As Metz points out, it is this apocalyptic expectation that 
grounds Christian responsibility to the world. That is why the public role of religion is 
interruptive: it entails the public task of reminding the world that there is an eschaton.  
 The apocalyptic imminent expectation stands against an empty, evolutionistic, 
understanding of time. In an essay called “Theology versus Polymythicism: a Short 
Apology for Biblical Monotheism,”88 Metz addresses the issue of modern time as myth: a 
myth that imagines time as an empty evolutionistic and limitless infinitude. History 
becomes anonymous when God is erased from the historical horizon.  
 Against this approach Metz brings to the forefront the Jewish-Christian 
monotheistic God. The modern understanding of time is closer to the polytheistic Greek 
world where time is seen as an evolutionistically limitless, empty, and continuous. This 
view makes God unthinkable and memories (of Jesus and of the vanquished) lose their 
strength. This evolutionistic vision of time leads to apathy in public life. On the contrary, 
the Christian discourse on the God of the Bible breaks this modern myth. Ever since the 
story of Abraham the biblical landscape turns out to be an eschatological landscape, 
driven by the fulfillment of the promises.  God himself becomes the end of time and the 
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idea that God is coming constitutes, for Metz, the heart of the biblical perception of 
reality.  To have hope means to keep alive the images of the Kingdom of God. Remaining 
faithful to these images will allow the images of the promise to remain faithful to us.  
Christian eschatology reminds us that time is bounded, so we can remain hopeful. Love, 
solidarity, and the memories of Jesus become apocalyptic categories of interruption.  
  
b. Promise and Mission: Historical and Eschatological Dimension of 
Hope.  
 Apocalyptic eschatology looks to the future, although from the perspective of the 
memory of the suffering. The hope of the suffering lies in the fact that the eschaton will 
interrupt their history of pain and injustice.  The Church here plays a critical public role: 
she has not only to bear but also to communicate the memories of the suffering. The 
Church has to stress the conflict between the divine promises and the inequities of the 
world. This role goes far beyond the one assigned by modern morality to religious 
convictions. Hope stands as indignation before the suffering memories of the past. On the 
criteria of the kingdom, indifference regarding time is no longer permissible. Theology 
ought to introduce the issue of suffering again and again, in order to exercise an 
eschatological notion of hope.  
 That notion of hope has its point of departure in the contrast between the 
memories of the suffering and the biblical promises.  For Jürgen Moltmann89 it is the 
apocalyptic expectation that drives the missionary task of the Church to transform the 
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world90. And transforming the world seems to constitute more than a spiritual or private 
task: it is also a political mission. Moltmann was probably the first modern theologian to 
put together eschatological redemption and historical liberation as two aspects of a same 
reality: theology of the promise, theology of the future of Christ, and apostolic mission all 
bring hope and liberation. To be oriented to the eschaton, implies Moltmann, is to work 
for justice here and now. That is why hope is not only eschatological, but also historical. 
“It makes the Church the source of continual new impulses towards the realization of 
righteousness, freedom, and humanity here, [but] in the light of the promised future that 
is to come.”91  Moltmann aims to bridge the gap between eschatology and politics in the 
sense that he stresses the continuity between heavenly promises and worldly history. 
God’s promise has political implications: to satisfy the hunger for the divine right and 
justice in this world.  
 This gap is bridged through the relationship between promise and mission, a 
correlation that comes from the experience of the witnesses of the Resurrected. The 
Christian consciousness of history is one of mission: to bring hope to society. Hope is 
also historical because we wait for the presence of what is coming to us. This arriving 
future, which brings something totally new, but in continuity with the past, works by 
awakening hopes and establishing resistance to injustice.  
 Hope is political not in the sense of adopting a historical utopia, but in the sense 
of bringing to public life the Christian message. Hope helps us to understand creation as 
an ongoing process: consummation means nothing else than the transformation of this 
present world. The eschatological horizon of hope allows theology to frame its 
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relationship to the civil society by shaping the beliefs and practices of all Christians. Here 
hope helps theology to stand against the trend that leads to the privatization of faith. Hope 
constitutes a horizon of fulfillment, plenitude, justice, and consummation, not just for the 
individual, but for the whole of society. It is because of its eschatological structure that 
theology is in itself political: because Christian hope becomes an opportunity to fulfill the 
deepest human longings for peace, justice, and reconciliation. Awareness of the history of 
Jesus being resurrected is, at the same time, awareness of mission. Christianity exercises 
its public role in pursuing the fulfillment of the divine promises. In hope two human 
longings meet: on the one hand the humanistic desire for justice and, on the other, the 
anthropological quest for transcendence.  
 Jon Sobrino, who draws on Metz’s political theology, argues that it is the lordship 
of Christ that generates hope.92 The resurrection of Jesus became again a central theme 
around the time of Vatican II. It brought back to the fore a Paschal approach to the liturgy 
that overcomes “sacrificialism” and recovers the value of corporality. When arguing that 
hope has a political/public character, we distance ourselves from the approach to the 
meaning of the cross as expiatory offering. More than a sacrifice of expiation for the sins 
of the world, a liberating understanding of the Paschal mysteries leads us to read history 
eschatologically: Jesus as the incarnation of a future that frees humankind from suffering 
and injustice. It is the content of the cross what makes the resurrection an event of 
liberating love.  
 Jesus’ Resurrection opens resurrection to all human beings, and retrieves Isaiah’s 
apocalyptic eschatology of a new heaven and a new earth. It revaluates future and hope. 
For Christian faith, Sobrino adds, the resurrection not only refers to the future of history, 
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but also has present meaning. It has political consequences in the sense that the 
resurrection brings hope, above all, to the victims of history. Because God resurrected the 
crucified one, hope is hope primarily for the abandoned and the outcast. Jesus’ 
resurrection brings hope, above all, for those crucified in history.  
 Christian hope can only be realistic and liberating if capable of apprehending the 
negative elements of history, especially the pain and suffering of the poor. Christian faith 
turns out to be relevant for society when it reveals its commitment to the history of the 
crucified one. The resurrection of Christ brings hope to the poor because the crucified 
Christ becomes the brother of the abandoned, the marginalized, and the oppressed. God 
raised a rejected man and that is why his resurrection comes across as hope for those 
without rights.93 The story of the crucified and resurrected one gives to the victims the 
courage to hope in their own resurrection.94 Hope keeps faith linked to life, history, 
society, and the world.  
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Conclusion 
 
 Christian Faith ought to ask time and again how to remain a living religion. 
Whereas for those who believe there are some aspects of faith that continue intact 
throughout history, the place and the role of religion in society must be renegotiated, 
taking into account the nature of Christian faith and the signs of the times. There seems to 
be a fair amount of confusion regarding the relationship between religion and politics. 
Catholic Christianity should be aware that the role of religion is today maybe more 
important than ever.  In a world that wishes to control every dimension of human life, 
from its beginning to its end, the Church can remain as a living institution by helping 
society to discern what really humanizes and what dehumanizes life. Seeing society as an 
ethical community, Christians can lead it to reflect publicly upon their moral structures. 
Contrasting the divine promises with the reality of the poor and the suffering, the Church 
can raise questions about justice, the use of massive weapons, the access to means 
necessary for life, the issue of abortion, and so on.  
 Liberal secularism demands that we separate our identity as citizens from the 
moral and religious convictions that define who we are when engaging in public 
discourse about justice, rights, and the good life. To counter this view, I have defended 
the continuity between our core identity and the political propositions that we espouse.  
Christian faith can contribute to democratic societies when emphasizing an idea of 
politics grounded on a concept of human person as essentially interrelated with others. 
Any project that aims to build solidarity upon some individualistic common denominator 
(individual happiness, individual freedom) seems to be flawed. Instead, we can work out 
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a notion of solidarity that begins from within faith communities, moral traditions, and 
symbolic frameworks, thus exploring the way different traditions have managed to deal 
with that diversity and pluralism. This seems to be a possible way to construe a richer, 
deeper, and probably more lasting approach to the common good. Perhaps the best 
resource for a true inter-traditional dialogue would then come from our own sense of 
identity, from belonging to a particular community and tradition. Solidarity is not 
something external, but something deeply spiritual and moral. Nevertheless, these 
insights would be only helpful if they were patient of respect for freedom, equality, and 
tolerance.  
 Against individualistic modern theories that reduce the common good to an 
aggregated sum of individual choices, the Catholic Church can remind society that an 
ethical life may exist only as an intersubjective construction: individual choices only 
meet moral criteria when they become interpersonal. By going public, a Christian faith 
that has incorporated the Enlightenment critique to religion can contribute to the vigor of 
public life.  
 Throughout this thesis I have tried to address the question of how to articulate a 
Catholic theology for a public life in a plural society. In that regard this work has 
followed the track of a large community of theologians who, being aware of the 
limitations of a project that deals with convictions and political liberties, have remained 
both engaged and humble. A very provisional answer might rely on framing the 
relationship between religious convictions and democracy in terms that could go beyond 
secular liberalism and religious traditionalism. We need new forms of theological 
imagination, on the one hand, and new forms of political imagination on the other. 
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 New forms of theological imagination would be based on evangelical principles, 
which would inform a theology capable of discerning the signs of the Times, as well as 
on the search for new philosophical and moral categories that would allow theology to 
enter into a fruitful and respectful dialogue with diversity. New forms of political 
imagination would be capable of disclosing the ideological aspects that have infiltrated 
certain dimensions of secularism: some of its claims of rationality and neutrality seem not 
to be as well founded as some secularist claim.  
 I have attempted to prove throughout this thesis that we can find, along Taylor’s 
lines, new moral grounds for the publicity and plausibility of religious contributions. The 
search for the good life, as part of a fuller understanding of human agency, is not 
something that must be overcome. Rather, this search needs to be promoted in order to 
build up a generative pluralism able to incorporate the diversity of lifeworlds present in 
contemporary societies. Like religious fundamentalism, the modern idea of rationality, 
the scientific attempt to control life, and the notion of time as limitless progress might 
become a form of violence. They end up removing memory, religious symbolism and 
ritualism, ethical and aesthetical belonging from the public praxis of human beings.  
 A lucid reading of modernity would unveil some of the ethical-comprehensive 
commitments of modernity. It might reveal that freedom, equality, and mutual respect are 
not values that were born during the Enlightenment but values that have a profound 
Judeo-Christian background. The public role of Christianity can be compatible with 
respect of religious freedom of non-Christians because the respect for the human person 
is a Christian value. In exposing the non-neutrality of secular liberalism, we become 
 99 
aware that Judeo Christianity has played an important role in shaping some of the 
features of Western societies.  
 A richer version of ethical life –as opposed to a limited notion of morality as 
obligatory action– compatible with freedom, equality, and mutual respect; the recognition 
of some constitutive social goods that are at the base of the very definition of the modern 
identity; and the egalitarian commitment to the “affirmation of ordinary life” might 
prompt us to expand the permissible contributions of religious communities to the 
construction of a common notion of shared ends and goods.  Likewise, the Church, 
bringing about an apocalyptic hope, can stress the need for historical liberation from 
suffering and injustice in light of the definitive divine promises that ultimately drive 
human history and foster solidarity.  
 I believe there should be no contradiction in being a believer deeply committed to 
his faith and a democratic citizen aware of the diversity present in modern societies. On 
the contrary, some of the principles developed here can help us to defend the legitimacy 
of shared loyalty: a deep allegiance to the ultimate convictions that define who we are 
and an open receptivity to differences and pluralism.  
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